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ABSTRACT 
This paper addresses the claim that there is “zero privacy” for Canadians on the internet.  
For the interpersonal computing era 1992 to 2007, the relationship between the three 
major agents (i.e., individual users, federal government, and business) operating on the 
internet was examined.  Three questions guided the research: how has the popular press 
educated Canadians about internet privacy? what has been the response of the federal 
government? how have online companies protected the privacy of Canadians?  Content 
analyses of (a) Maclean’s magazine, (b) the Privacy Commissioner's Annual Reports to 
Parliament, (c) and the privacy policies of the most visited websites were conducted.  
Complex Adaptive Systems theory indicated that privacy is an emergent property arising 
from the interaction of the agents and that the internet is an environment where the 
agents' interactions lead to limited privacy. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Overview 
In 1999, the Chief Executive Officer of Sun Microsystems, an American company 
specializing in computers, software, and information technology, stated that “[we] have zero 
privacy anyways” in response to consumer concerns regarding privacy and the internet.  His 
comments highlighted the sophisticated technical systems that existed in the 1990s for 
monitoring activities on the internet.  In the ten years since that statement was made, the 
level of technical sophistication has only continued to increase.  Consider, for example, the 
Street View function of Google Earth – a map generating software program developed by 
the internet company Google.  To create Street View, Google cameras scan a street scene to 
produce an image for the mapping application, and in the process, the cameras inadvertently 
capture identifying personal information, such as licence plate numbers and recognizable 
images of individuals on the street (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 2007).   These 
maps, with the attached personal information, are then posted to the Google Earth site 
where a user with a computer and internet connection can view the scenes (Canadian 
Broadcasting Corporation, 2007).    
 
Despite the seemingly unanticipated impact of software programs like Google Earth on the 
privacy of citizens, sociologists and other academics with the training and vision necessary 
to examine privacy and the internet are not contributing sufficiently to this area of research, 
although according to some sociologists, they should be (DiMaggio, Hargittai, Neuman, & 
Robinson, 2001:307).  For example, the sweeping generalization made by Sun 
Microsystems’ Chief Executive Officer (CEO) that internet users have “zero privacy” needs 
to be challenged.   
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The purpose of this thesis was to develop a framework for evaluating this statement; that is, 
is there (potentially) “zero privacy” on the internet?  It is argued that the limits to privacy 
emerge from the architecture of the internet itself and interactions among the major agents.  
1.2 Research Questions 
 For this thesis, the focus is on changes to personal privacy during the development of the 
interpersonal computing era1, the period 1992 to 2007, which includes the timeframe 
covered by the remarks of the CEO of Sun Microsystems.    Specifically, the research 
questions are the following: 
 
(a) How has the popular press educated Canadians about the potential changes in 
personal privacy associated with the advances in technology? 
(b) What has been the political response from the Canadian federal government to 
the potential changes in personal privacy associated with the advances in 
technology?  
(c) Do the privacy statements on the most popular commercial websites accessed by 
Canadians protect their personal information? 
 
1.3 Project Overview 
A fundamental premise of this paper is that internet privacy is an emergent property of 
agent interactions in a technical system.  The paper proceeds as follows.  In Chapter 2, 
privacy is conceptualized and a working definition is developed.  Then, the development of 
the architecture of the internet is traced in order to understand the relationship between the 
environment and privacy.  In Chapter 3, complex adaptive systems theory is introduced to 
explain how privacy is conceptualized on the internet.  Chapters 4 and 5 describe the 
methodology and present the results based on content analysis of three data sources.  
Maclean’s and the Privacy Commissioner’s Reports provided the data to answer the first 
two research questions; Alexa media provided the data for the third question.   
                                            
1 The interpersonal computing era as defined by Beekman, Quinn & Anderson-Freed (2006) began in the early 
1990s and continues through to the present. 
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CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND INFORMATION AND 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The following chapter conceptualizes the research questions in the context of privacy and 
the internet from several perspectives.  The chapter begins with a discussion on privacy 
which is followed by a discussion on what is meant by internet privacy and how technical 
developments, including the rise of databases, place limits on privacy.  And finally, the 
existing literature with respect to personal privacy on the internet is reviewed, and the 
theoretical framework used to guide this research is introduced. 
2.1 What is Privacy? 
There is no generally accepted definition, or “singular essence”, of privacy (Solove, 
2008:iv). Westin (2003:431) defines privacy as “the claim of an individual to determine 
what information about himself or herself should be known to others”, whereas Warren and 
Brandeis (1890:193) define the term as “the right to be [left] alone”.  The use of the term 
privacy may also be confused with other related terms such as liberty, autonomy, secrecy, or 
solitude (Tavani, 2007:3).  Robert Post argued that given the number of distinct and 
competing meanings of privacy, using the word at all can be problematic, suggesting that 
one conceptualization will not suit all circumstances (Solove, 2008:2).  
  
Another concern is which definition will be most influential.  The Privacy Commissioner of 
Canada defines privacy as the protection of collection, use, or disclosure of personal 
information (Privacy Commissioner, 2008). Further, personal information is defined as 
"factual or subjective information, recorded or not, about an identifiable individual" (e.g., 
age, name, income, credit records) but does not include information that can "be found 
through publicly available information such as the telephone book" (Privacy Commissioner, 
2008).  Businesses that operate in Canada are required to comply with provincial and 
federal privacy legislation and the definitions therein.  Given this requirement for 
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compliance, it can be argued that businesses are most likely to define privacy for their 
business use in keeping with the legislation.   However, if a business finds the definition to 
be overly restrictive it can choose to operate its business in a more favourable legislative 
environment (e.g., moving internet servers outside of the jurisdiction).   
 
For users, privacy is defined both individually and through interaction with business and 
government.  For example, when users visit social networking websites like Facebook or 
MySpace, they have a “take-it-or-leave-it” choice regarding their personal information.  
That is, the user can choose to participate (i.e., provide personal information), or choose not 
to use the service.  Of course, a user may decide to provide incorrect information (e.g., 
provide an alias) to increase anonymity online.  In general, then, structural and 
organizational forces reduce the ability for individuals to control their personal information 
(Bennett & French, 2003).  That is, when interacting with business and government, users 
generally have to accept the definition of privacy provided in order to receive the service.  
 
Another approach to understanding privacy, one which tends to mitigate definitional issues, 
is to address the question posed by Clapham, “what is [privacy] supposed to protect?” 
which suggests, as other researchers have also noted, that privacy protects different things 
depending on context (Clapham, 2007:109; Paine, Reip, Stieger, Joinson, & Buchanan, 
2007:526; Bannister, 2005:66).  For example, when an individual is in a washroom, privacy 
refers to not being observed by surveillance cameras, and when an individual is in a 
telephone booth, privacy refers to not being overheard by passersby.  Understandably, this 
contextualization of privacy is temporal.  For example, the concept of privacy envisioned  
by Warren and Brandeis in 1891 was centred on individuals being free from unwanted 
observation and being able to restrict the circulation of personal information.  Over the next 
100 years, personal feelings of humiliation and anger have driven the need for privacy 
rights, resulting in periodic re-examination of what needs to be protected (Clapham, 2007).  
Today, the right to privacy (a residual right), like all human rights, focuses on maintaining 
human dignity (Clapham, 2007).  And with the advances in communication information 
technology of the past 25 years, the dimensions of privacy are again being reconsidered.  
Perhaps the ability to adapt to changing conceptualizations of privacy within society 
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represents the most powerful aspect of the concept – to remain relevant through adaptation 
to societal change (Clapham, 2007). 
 
One such adaptation is that required to address the threats to privacy encountered on the 
internet.  In this context, there are four constructs that generally need to be considered.  
First, privacy in Canada should not be considered as a private/public dichotomy, but rather, 
as a continuum ranging from clearly private to clearly public.  Solove posited that although 
some personal information is neither intimate nor directly private, that information is not 
then public (2008:69).  In the context of the internet, for example, although a personal email 
address is not intimate, the address is not automatically considered public.  Removing this 
arbitrary dichotomy between public and privacy may further improve overall societal 
function, for a continuum of the personal allows for greater freedom to explore social issues 
(Clapham, 2007).  
 
Second, privacy should be considered not only an individual right, but also a social value 
because considering it just an individual right “undervalues” the concept within Canadian 
society (Solove, 2008:79, 89).  For when individual privacy “rights” have been violated to 
protect the greater good, such violations ultimately define the general protection offered to 
every member of that society (Solove, 2008).  For example, the Canadian government is 
drafting a new wiretap law applicable to the internet (e.g., email).  Such legislation, should 
it pass into law, will fundamentally change how the police monitor Canadians: no longer 
will the information need to be captured in “real time” (i.e., download a copy from the ISP) 
and the possibility exists to capture information transmitted in the past (e.g., emails from 
last month) (CBC, 2009).  Privacy allows individuals to develop their beliefs, political 
opinions, critiques, countercultures, and to experiment outside of the judgement of societal 
norms (Solove, 2008:80).  Accordingly, privacy should be considered in terms of its 
contribution to society rather than solely as a possession of individuals (Solove 2008:91).  
In brief, privacy is protected not entirely for the individual’s needs, but for the needs of a 
healthy society and, therefore, should be embedded in social structure (Solove, 2008:92,93). 
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Third, the question of who controls the personal information collected is an issue evolving 
from the technical aspects of the internet, an issue germane to the concept of internet 
privacy (Solove, 2004:167; Solove, 2008:19,24).  Often, control is obtained through 
ownership of the information (i.e., personal information belongs to the identified 
individual), but in the context of the internet, this definition is not sufficient; rather the 
question becomes who owns the environmental information (e.g., IP address, CPU size, 
entry and exit pages, and operating system) collected from users?  Solove points out that 
“individuals are not the lone creators of their web-browsing information, for most of that 
information is created from the interaction between the user and websites” (2008:27.83).     
 
Fourth, secrecy, or the concealment of information, is related to privacy and of special 
importance to the internet and internet privacy (Solove, 2008:21).  Secrecy highlights the 
potentially negative aspects of privacy and indicates how privacy can be used to present or 
preserve an image that may not be consistent with the information available.  Within 
society, the need for privacy must be balanced with the need to prevent harm to society 
(Solove, 2008:76).  However, it is important to recognize that secrecy, as a part of internet 
privacy, is also relative: secrecy depends on the situation.  Internet secrecy can refer to (a) 
users who use anonymizing software (software that uses a “proxy” public server to mask the 
user’s server) to surf the internet free from adware (software programs that deliver 
advertisements based on data gathered from cookies on users computers), or (b) to those 
users who use the same software to post derogatory or inflammatory comments on a 
webpage message board. 
 
In addition to these four constructs, there are two metaphors to consider -- Big Brother and 
The Trial.  The dominant metaphor for loss of privacy or the limitations of privacy is Big 
Brother (Solove, 2004:27).  Big Brother, the totalitarian government portrayed in George 
Orwell’s novel 1984, is all-knowing and always watchful, a government whose citizens are 
always under surveillance, or are always under the threat of surveillance (Solove, 
2004:7,34).  The underlying concept of Big Brother is that privacy is invaded by a 
benevolent power.  Sociologist Michel Foucault utilized a Big Brother perspective when 
arguing that “surveillance changes the entire landscape in which people act, leading toward 
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an internalization of social norms that soon is not even perceived as repressive” (Solove, 
2004:35).  The metaphor of Big Brother has been expanded to include Little Brothers, or 
businesses, referring to the role business plays in monitoring citizens for its own business 
purposes or for assisting Big Brother (Solove, 2004:32).  For example, businesses are Little 
Brothers when they turn over their customer data to law enforcement agencies.   
 
There are, however, two limitations to using the Big Brother metaphor to conceptualize 
privacy on the internet: (a) commercial organizations do not generally collect customer 
information to aid totalitarianism, and (b) surveillance is accomplished using software 
programs (dataveillance), meaning there is no direct observation of users by others.  
Accordingly, Solove argues that with respect to privacy on the internet, Big Brother is an 
incomplete metaphor (2004:27).  He suggests a different metaphor, the bureaucracy 
highlighted in Franz Kafka’s The Trial.  This existentialist novel captures Joseph K’s 
“helplessness, frustration, and vulnerability when a large bureaucratic organization has 
control over a vast dossier of details about one’s life…with little accountability”, details that 
are also “inaccessible” to Joseph K (Solove, 2004:9,36).  Instead of conceptualizing privacy 
as a Big Brother-style invasion, the limits of privacy emerge from the architecture of the 
bureaucracy depicted in The Trial.   That is, the architecture of the legal system and the 
relationships between the lawyers, judges, and Joseph K all impact the bureaucracy.  Using 
The Trial metaphor, the limits of privacy are then a result of (a) the architecture of the 
system itself and (b) the interactions of those involved in the system. 
 
For the present research, the following operational definition of internet privacy, based on 
the four constructs, The Trial metaphor, and modelled on Westin’s definition (2003) was 
used to discuss privacy: internet privacy is a claim of Canadian society to determine what 
personal information about its citizens should be known to others.   That is, (a) a claim of 
Canadian society addresses the social values and the structural aspects of privacy; (b) to 
determine what personal information about its citizens, addresses the issue of the 
dichotomy, suggesting members of a society must decide what personal information is 
private and to what degree it is private; and, (c) should be known to others, addresses 
disclosure.   The term society was used in the operational definition instead of a specific 
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group (e.g., Canadians, Canadian government, or Canadian business) because the 
relationship between each group on the internet defines the level of privacy (a point made 
earlier), and this relationship is congruent with a definition of a society. 
2.2 Review of Technical Developments Related to Internet Privacy 
The development of the internet can best be understood in terms of three computing eras:  
the institutional, the personal, and the interpersonal (Beekman, Quinn & Anderson-Freed, 
2006:48).  The institutional era,  beginning in the early 1950s, was characterized by a few 
large computers operated by computer experts; the personal era, beginning in the mid 
1970s, by the widespread availability of stand-alone computers for use in schools and 
offices; and most recently, the interpersonal era, beginning in the mid 1990s, by 
interconnected personal computers (Beekman, Quinn & Anderson-Freed, 2006:48).  It 
should be noted that until the third computing era, most personal computers were not 
connected to the internet (Beekman, Quinn & Anderson-Freed, 2006:48). 
 
Although the focus of this research is on the interpersonal computing era and the technical 
(i.e., software and hardware) developments of that period, much of the infrastructure of the 
internet was in place before 1992. In the institutional era, the first internet system, 
Advanced Research Projects Agency Network (ARPANET), was created to link defence 
contractors and military research laboratories across the United States (Schell & Dodge, 
2002:25).  ARPANET allowed scientists and contractors to advance their respective 
collaborative work and to experiment with the capabilities of the network itself.  By the 
1970s, ARPANET was open to non-military organizations, a development which marked 
the beginning of a publicly available internet, although access was restricted primarily to 
universities and businesses as personal computers were not yet in widespread use. 
 
The personal computing era began with the introduction of the microprocessor and 
microchip in the early 1970s, two technical innovations which caused “immediate and 
radical changes in the appearance, capability, and availability of computers” (Beekman, 
Quinn & Anderson-Freed, 2006:41).  The new computers were smaller, cheaper, and more 
powerful, allowing them to fit the needs of businesses, educators, and families.  The internet 
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also underwent two noteworthy changes during this era: (a) it became international (i.e., 
connections established to computers outside the United States), and (b) domain names and 
email protocols were developed (i.e., two features of the underlying structure of the current 
internet).   
 
The present interpersonal computing era began with the introduction of software which 
improved the internet’s usability for non-computer experts, rendering the internet accessible 
to anyone who could “point to buttons on a computer screen” (Beekman, Quinn & 
Anderson-Freed, 2006:49).  This advancement also transformed the internet from a “text-
only environment [to] a multimedia landscape” (Beekman, Quinn & Anderson-Freed, 
2006:49).  Two noteworthy events of this era were (a) the development of URL, HTML, 
and HTTP2, the backbone technologies of the World Wide Web, and (b) the appearance of 
commercial providers selling individual access to the internet (Beekman, Quinn & 
Anderson-Freed, 2006).  
 
It was during the interpersonal era that personal privacy became an issue for four main 
reasons.  First, the number of internet users grew faster than the control systems being put in 
place to protect users.  Second, computer processing and storage space increased 
substantially, leading to the development of large, integrated databases of personal 
information that could be easily collected, stored, and searched.  Third, and related to the 
previous issue, personal data was commodified.  Finally, advanced end user computing 
tools became widely available, leading to the rise of viruses and other sophisticated 
malicious software (Beekman, Quinn & Anderson-Freed, 2006:49). 
 
Considering the four reasons in turn, first, the number of internet users grew exponentially 
during the interpersonal area: in 1994 the internet had 3 million users worldwide; by 2003, 
there were 580 million users; and by 2008, 1.4 billion users (Beekman, Quinn & Anderson-
Freed, 2006:49; Internet World Stats, 2008).  With the increasing number of non-computer 
experts using the system, new users were unaware of the risks of the inherently insecure 
                                            
2 URL (universal resource locator) is the unique address of each internet document; HTML (hypertext mark-
up language) is the computer language used for coding and displaying hypertext documents; HTTP 
(hypertext transfer protocol) presents the rules for linking hypertext documents. 
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system.  Further, with more users, malicious software attacks damaged more computers, and 
obtaining information from the internet (e.g., personal information or business information) 
became more economically viable. 
 
Second, databases are composed of tables of related information and can be as 
straightforward as an Excel spreadsheet of bake-sale volunteer names and addresses (i.e., an 
application requiring one table) or as complex as an airline reservation system containing 
many interrelated tables (Beekman, Quinn & Anderson-Freed, 2006:267,268,279).  
Computerized databases are used for (a) storing large quantities of information, (b) 
organizing and reorganizing information, (c) distributing print or email information, and (d) 
retrieving information quickly (Beekman, Quinn & Anderson-Freed, 2006:267,268).   
 
Databases were first developed by governments to collect and store information concerning 
their citizens, but it was business that later drove their use (Solove, 2004:16).  Business 
owners in their early attempts to understand their customer needs, used techniques such as 
mass marketing, but these techniques were expensive and reached more than the target 
group.  To increase efficiency, marketers in the 1970s started using demographic data to 
refine direct marketing techniques, a change made possible because computer databases 
made collecting and using demographic data easier.  Since the 1970s, these databases have 
grown to contain a sizeable collection of customer profiles, a collection that can often 
represent the most valuable property a company owns (Solove, 2004:19).   
    
Data-mining in a database, or the “discovery and extraction of hidden predictive 
information” using statistical procedures and artificial intelligence technology, is an 
additional privacy concern (Beekman, Quinn & Anderson-Freed, 2006:282).  An 
organization using data-mining techniques can expose previously unknown relationships 
among data.  For example, a grocery store chain using data-mining found that the men who 
bought diapers on Friday nights at their stores also purchased alcoholic beverages (Larose, 
2005).  Another technique applied to databases is referred to as aggregation or the 
“combined bits and pieces of data…to form a portrait of a person” (Solove, 2008:118).  The 
portrait is obtained by combining individual pieces of information gathered at different 
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times or places into one aggregate report.  For example, combining demographic data with 
credit rating information and purchase history provides a better picture of an individual’s 
financial status.  Data aggregation, like that pointed out in the above example, occurs 
because many internet websites subscribe to “DoubleClick”, a type of information 
collection software program that consolidates all the different cookies (parcels of text that 
uniquely identify users) from various websites to create a more complete profile of an 
individual (Solove, 2004:24).  Data-mining and aggregation techniques are a privacy 
concern because the individuals profiled do not realize or are not informed that various data 
banks may be accessed to profile them.  
 
Because the internet supports collection technologies like those described above, it has 
enabled “unprecedented” amounts of information about users to be gathered, combined, 
analyzed, and stored by third parties, an activity which leads to a reduction in the ability for 
users to control their personal information (Bannister, 2005; Hinduja, 2004; Solove, 
2004:167,216).  Any one piece of personal information stored in the database does not 
necessarily reflect a privacy problem; rather, it is all the pieces that combine to form an 
aggregate profile of the individual, with the result that “the whole is greater than the sum of 
its parts” (Solove, 2008:117).  For example, as suggested earlier, several databases provide 
a more accurate profile of an individual than any of the databases separately.  However, it 
was only with the increasing processing capacities of computers and the increasing amount 
of data transferred to them that techniques like data-mining became viable. 
 
Third, data, specifically consumer data, have become one of the new currencies of modern 
western society (Beekman, Quinn & Anderson-Freed, 2006:286).  For example, one 
analysis of 15,000 marketing databases found that the databases contained personal 
information on about 2 billion individuals, including details such as age, income, and 
political affiliation (Beekman, Quinn & Anderson-Freed, 2006:286).  This information can 
be obtained as the result of an exchange between a customer and a merchant.  For instance, 
a customer obtains a discount at a grocery store in exchange for using the store’s 
computerized customer card, a transaction which the merchant can then use to track the 
customer’s purchases in a marketing database.  This example illustrates that as personal 
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information becomes useful for a business (e.g., for improving business service or targeting 
advertising), it is commodified, and its value is no longer social or personal; rather, it 
becomes a commercial asset.  This commodification raises three concerns: (a) who, the 
individual or the company, controls the information? (i.e., ownership), (b) what laws, 
national or international, protect the personal information?, and (c) what kinds of 
information may be collected?  Further, when data are commodified, they need to be stored 
where the information is easily accessible, for example, in a database.     
 
Finally, the introduction of end-user software (e.g., JAVA) gave general users uncontrolled 
access to powerful programming tools, tools that in the past would have required a 
computer programmer’s level of knowledge to execute.  It is this software which can be 
used to create damaging malicious software. 
2.3 Literature Review 
Much of the research that has been conducted on internet privacy has been the work of 
academics in disciplines other than sociology (especially business, law, and computer 
science) and has focused on (a) the relationship between specific attributes and/or 
behaviours and privacy concerns and (b) the privacy policies of internet businesses 
(DiMaggio et al., 2001).     
 
An example of the first type is the work of Miyazaki and Fernandez, (2001) who surveyed 
162 adults’ risk perception and internet experience related to online shopping activity.  
Internet experience, in this research, was measured using two indicators: duration (number 
of years/months of regular internet access) and frequency (number of times per month the 
world wide web was accessed).  The authors found an inverse relationship between internet 
experience and perceived risk regarding online shopping transactions (i.e., increased levels 
of internet experience led to lower perceived risk) but a positive relationship between 
internet experience and general privacy concerns (i.e., greater internet experience leads to 
higher levels of concern).  Further, Paine, Reip, Stieger, Joinson, and Buchanan (2007) 
found that gender was not statistically significant in explaining privacy concerns; however, 
another variable, age, was positively correlated with privacy concerns.  Interestingly, and 
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unlike Miyazaki and Fernandez research, there was no significant relationship between 
years of experience, hours spent online, and privacy concerns. Paine et al. (2007) also found 
that participants were concerned about privacy online but were unable to take precautions 
because they were unsure of how to increase online privacy.   
 
With respect to the second area of research, privacy policies, the focus has been on the 
content of privacy policies posted on internet websites.  In a four year longitudinal study, 
Milne and Culnan (2002) evaluated the privacy policies of 30 high-traffic American 
websites (e.g., FedEx and Citibank websites).  They concluded that although there was an 
increase in the number of privacy polices and disclaimers posted over the period of the 
study, there was no way to determine if the companies involved were actually complying 
with the posted statements (Milne & Culnan, 2002).  A second study by Graber, 
D’Alessandro, and Johnson-West (2002) analyzed the reading ease of privacy policies 
posted on American health related websites.  The authors concluded that on average two 
years of college education were needed to understand the policies.  A telephone survey of 
1,000 American adults by Culnan and Armstrong (1999) investigated whether a privacy 
statement posted by a web-based company would convince people to share personal 
information.  The authors found that when individuals are informed about how their 
information is to be used, privacy concerns are alleviated.  Additionally, a study by Hui, 
Teo, and Lee (2007) assessed how consumers respond to privacy statements posted on 
websites collecting personal information.  A field experiment was conducted in which 
participants answered an online survey; some respondents received a survey with privacy 
assurances and some received a survey without privacy assurances.  The authors analyzed 
the amount of personal information reported by respondents under each of the conditions 
and concluded that individuals provide more personal information when presented with 
privacy assurances (Hui, Teo, & Lee, 2007).  And finally, a study by Lauer and Deng 
(2007) of 269 American undergraduates found that trust in an online company was 
dependant upon the perceived respect for consumer/user privacy expressed in the 
company’s privacy policy.  Trust, according to the authors, is important for successful 
online business transactions (Lauer & Deng, 2007). 
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In summary, internet privacy is an emerging area of inquiry that to-date has focused on how 
users interact with the system for primarily commercial purposes. The challenge for 
researchers concerned with understanding more complex interactions is explaining the 
dynamic properties of such interactions, a task for which Stacey (2007) and his Complex 
Adaptive Systems theory offers some analytic tools.  Part of the challenge of understanding 
internet privacy is to determine how the internet interacts with those who use it (e.g., 
business, government, or users) and how it changes during these interactions.       
2.4 A Complex Adaptive Systems Theory and the Internet  
The Information Age (late 20th century) refers to a type of networked society of which the 
internet is a part (Castells, 2000:695; Beekman, Quinn, & Anderson-Freed, 2005:51).  
Networks are not a new form of social organization, but older networks could not “manage 
complexity beyond a critical size” in the way new systems can (Castells, 2000:695).  
Although network analysis has been the most common approach to understanding social 
structures, traditional network analysis misses the relational meanings within a network 
(Emirbayer, 1997:300).  That is, additional meanings concerning networks arise from a 
concept’s “place” in the system (Emirbayer, 1997:300).   
 
To interpret the network society, Castells suggests that sociologists (a) re-conceptualize 
how they understand networks, appreciating that networks can exist without centralized 
power or hierarchies, and (b) use the new analytical tools (e.g., “computer-based system 
analysis of dynamic networks”) to describe the nonlinear dynamics observed in such 
networks (Castells, 2000:696,698).  He posits that sociologists will have to develop 
“through synergy among relevant theorizing, computational literacy, and sociological 
imagination” a new way of understanding these networks (Castells, 2000:698).   
 
One theoretical model that incorporates the relational approach suggested by Emirbayer and 
the dynamics suggested by Castells is complexity theory.  The theory offers new conceptual 
tools to understand the “diversity of modernity” and an alternative way to conceptualize 
connections within systems (Walby, 2003:11,13).  This inter-disciplinary theory (forms of 
complexity theory are used in business, economics, mathematics, and biology) provides the 
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“concepts, methods and epistemology” needed to understand the society emerging from the 
Information Age (Walby, 2003:11).  Further, complexity allows for the study of the system 
with an “anti-reductionist analytic strategy”, meaning the theory works at the macro level 
without denying individual agency (Walby, 2003:11).  In addition, complexity theory does 
not assume hierarchical forms within interconnections, an assumption allowing for a more 
flexible approach than traditional network theories utilized by Parsons or Marx (Walby, 
2003:14).  A hierarchical system is one in which those with power or higher positions (e.g., 
bosses) control the changes to the system.  However, Stacey (2007:111) argues that 
hierarchical change of any entire system is not possible; instead, change occurs through the 
local-level interactions.  By expanding analysis from a hierarchical approach, researchers 
can understand how other types of interactions lead to system change. 
 
In order to apply this theory to the internet, it must first be determined if the internet 
displays the features of a complex system.  A complex system refers to a system that is 
comprised of a number of interconnected elements which change over time (Stacey, 2007).  
Weather prediction is an example of such a system where many interconnected elements 
(e.g., temperature, air pressure, wind speed, wind direction, and humidity) create a dynamic 
system, one where specific outcomes are not easily predictable in the long term.  Like the 
weather system, the internet is constructed from many interconnected parts: the physical 
network of fibre, routers, and servers connecting computers around the world, billions of 
interconnected web pages, and a billion users.   
 
There are two general criteria for a complex system to qualify as a CAS: first, the system 
must be constructed from a large number of agents acting in accordance to a set of rules, 
and second, the interactions between agents must produce orderly patterns (Stacey, 2007).  
The internet displays these two criteria because, (a) there are a large number of agents and 
their use is constrained by a set of rules, and (b) the interactions between the agents produce 
recognizable patterns.  The observation that there are 1.4 billion users of the internet and 
every webpage they visit has a URL (universal resource locator), which gives the location 
of the specific page, supports criterion one, and the Power Law of Distribution, which can 
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predict the growth rate of a website using current size, growth, and number of links, 
supports criterion two (Howe, 2002). 
 
There are four additional characteristics used to identify complex systems: self-
organization, non-linearity, chaos, and emergent properties (Stacey, 2007).  Self-
organization is defined as a system where “the whole is required before the parts can have 
any function, and the parts must be designed” before the system can function (Stacey, 
2007:31).  That is, the system develops, or organizes, as a whole, gaining complexity during 
this organization.  Self-organization may be traced to the work of Immanuel Kant who 
questioned how a complex system could develop if the parts must have been pre-designed, 
thereby implying that the “notion” of the final (or current) system has already been 
formulated (Stacey, 2007:31).  Kant postulated that a complex system would need to start as 
a simpler system, and the causal development would be formative (rather than 
transformative) towards the current complexity (Stacey, 2007:31,32).  Web pages that are 
linked to one another are an example of a self-organizing network.  Characteristically, 
complex systems cannot be reduced to their independent elements without destroying the 
integrity of the system; that is, the elements themselves are too highly integrated to be 
separated into discrete parts (Stacey, 2007).   
   
Non-linearity refers to the elements or events that are not necessarily connected by time or 
space but lead to new or changed elements within a system, which in turn, affect the 
original elements (Stacey, 2007).  Further, “one variable can have more than proportional 
effect upon another” within a non-linear system (Stacey, 2007:13).  For example, 
Wikipedia, the online encyclopaedia, has developed non-linearly.   The hosting of 
Wikipedia, a public web page, led to a complex system of 10 million articles written by 
volunteers, which are open to revision by anyone with access to the site.   
 
In an ordered or linear system, the next developmental step is reliably predictable based on 
knowing the history of the system.  However, in a non-linear system, the further the 
predictions are projected onto future steps, the greater the likelihood the prediction fails, 
even with extensive historical knowledge (Stacey, 2007).  For example, on the internet, the 
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progression from telephone internet connections to wireless internet connections was a non-
linear technical development because the technology supporting telephone/cable 
connections was not a precursor to wireless technologies.   
 
Small events or historical events can have a significant impact on the development of, or 
changes to, a complex system.  For example, the design of the world wide web, which was 
originally rejected by the computer science establishment as “too simple, was the work of 
one computer programmer” (Beekman, Quinn & Anderson-Freed, 2006:222).  The 
uncertainty in prediction resulting from the multitude of interconnections is known as chaos.  
Chaos is useful for understanding the complex behaviours of systems which appear random 
but are actually governed by the deterministic properties of the system (Pekka, 1999).  
Further, the actual outcomes of chaotic systems are referred to as emergent properties or 
patterns, that is, the unpredictable, yet logical, outcome of changes to complex systems.  In 
a chaotic system there are two underlying assumptions: (a) an underlying order exists, and 
(b) small events or perturbations can cause complex changes or events. 
 
A classic example of a chaotic system is the butterfly effect.  In this case, the suggestion is 
made that because a chaotic system is sensitive to initial conditions,  when a butterfly flaps 
its wings in Brazil, it causes a small perturbation in the atmosphere that results in a tornado 
(the emergent property) in Texas (Pekka, 1999).  On the internet, the “butterfly effect” can 
be seen with the introduction of the world wide web.  That is, a file sharing system 
originally reserved for experts has evolved into a global, multi-media system accessed by 
millions of people every day.  
 
The underlying order of a complex system refers to the spatial patterns (or fractals) that 
emerge from such systems (Stacey, 2007:183).  According to Stacey (2007:183), 
recognizable patterns can emerge from a complex system, but these patterns are “chaotic” in 
nature as they can be either stable and regular, or unstable and irregular at any given point 
in time (Stacey, 2007:183).  Such emergent patterns are an indication of an underlying, or 
deep, dynamic structure.  For example, a sand dune is relatively stable most of the time, but 
when the wind comes up, the sand dune becomes unstable.  When the wind subsides, the 
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sand dune will re-stabilize in a new pattern that could not have been predicted from its 
original form.  In a system not in equilibrium (or in balance), small changes escalate within 
the system causing enough instability to radically change the system (Stacey, 2007:192).  
This type of system is difficult to understand using traditional structural theorizing, such as 
that of Talcott Parsons, whose theorizing is based on systems maintaining equilibrium with 
their environments (Holton,2006:155).  Accordingly, it becomes difficult to use classical 
structualist theory to understand dynamic systems as predictions cannot be made based on 
knowledge of the agents involved or their structure within the present systems  -- there is no 
system “blueprint” (Stacy, 2007:193,196).   
   
Viewing the internet as CAS allows the principles of this theory to guide privacy 
conceptualization in the internet environment.  In this environment, the different agents (i.e., 
government, business, and users) are acting in parallel, constantly acting and reacting to 
what the other agents are doing, an indication that the world wide web can be seen as a 
“giant, loosely woven, constantly changing document created by thousands of unrelated 
authors and scattered about in computers all over the world” (Beekman, Quinn & Anderson-
Freed, 2006:21).  The controls for this system tend to be highly dispersed and decentralized 
(i.e., there is no central authority controlling the internet’s development), and the overall 
behavior of the system is the result of every decision made every moment by many different 
agents (Stacey, 2007).   
 
This decentralization of control, along with the influence of different agents, affects internet 
privacy.  Figure 2.1 presents a simplified example of how privacy is affected by the 
interactions between agents operating on the internet.   Specifically, the figure shows the 
ways personal information is obtained and used through interaction with other agents.   
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Figure 2.1: Example of Privacy Issues that May Arise Through Agent Interactions  
 
In summary, privacy, including internet privacy, is a term that eludes a definitive definition.  
That is, since a “complete” definition of privacy cannot be constructed, an operational 
definition, developed earlier, serves to guide the interpretation of the research data.  For this 
research, internet privacy is considered a social value not an individual right, and it exists on 
a continuum depending on context.  The technical developments of the internet beginning in 
the 1970s have shaped the way privacy has been constructed.  The existing literature on the 
internet has focused on a limited number of user interactions for commercial purposes.  
Complex adaptive systems theory was offered as an explanation for how privacy has been 
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constructed on the internet. This theory accommodates the technical developments and 
allows for a structural analysis of the interactions among agents and will be used to interpret 
the results of the data analysis.  It is important to note that without this theoretical construct, 
issues of privacy cannot be fully understood, for it is the architecture of the internet and the 
mechanisms by which it is has evolved over time that influence privacy.  Chapter 3 explores 
the nature of the technical environment. 
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CHAPTER 3: TECHNOLOGY, PRIVACY AND THE 
INTERPERSONAL COMPUTING ERA 
To understand privacy in the interpersonal computing era requires an appreciation of the 
technical environment, and how the environment has changed over the period between 1989 
and 2007.  Figure 3.1 presents a timeline of the major developments.  Although this 
research focused on the interpersonal computing era for the years 1992 to 2007, several key 
technical developments important to internet privacy occurred just prior to 1992.  The 
timeline was extended back to 1989 to include these developments.     
 
An assortment of print and electronic sources was used to construct the timeline.  A 
technological advance was included if it (a) impacted the structure of the internet or 
computer systems, and (b) related to privacy.    Supplemental academic sources on privacy 
in the modern technical society were examined for major technical advances in the internet 
for the period 1989 to 2007 (Beekman, Quinn & Anderson-Freed, 2006; Solove, 2004; 
Solove, 2008; Schell & Dodge, 2002).  When an issue was technically complex or was a 
specialized problem, it was further examined using internet sources.  For example, 
processor speed specifications for Intel processors were obtained from the company’s 
website.    
 
Seven general categories of technical development are shown: search engines, operating 
systems, storage, web browsers, CPU, laptops, end user software and connectivity.  The 
timeline was used to identify four specific types of advancements that are pertinent to this 
research: (a) processors, processing speed, and miniaturization, (b) operating systems, (c) 
advanced end user software, and (d) connectivity.   
 
The processor, or CPU, is the component in a computer that executes programs.  The faster 
the CPU, the more complex the programs the computer can execute.  The timeline indicates 
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that speed increases from Pentium I (300 MHz), through Pentiums, II (450 MHz), III (1.4 
GHz), and 4 (3.8 GHz).  As well, portable storage size increased as the size of programs 
(resulting from increased complexity) increased.  Prior to 1990, portable storage devices 
took the form of diskettes, or “floppies” and held only a few megabytes3 (MB) of data.  
Later storage devices, such as the zip drive (1994), held 100 MB, increasing to 250MB and 
750MB; CD-RW (Compact Disc Read/Write), introduced in 1997, held 650 to 700MB; 
DVD-RW (Digital Video Disc Read/Write), introduced in 2002, held 4 to 8GB; and USB 
(Universal Serial Bus) flash drives, first introduced in 2000, hold up to 64GB.  As storage 
size increased, the physical size of computers and storage devices decreased; for example, 
the Apple iBook (2003) weighed 2.2kg, whereas the Macintosh Portable (1989) weighted 
7.3kg. With the decrease in physical size, the ability to keep computers, their storage 
devices, and the data stored on these devices secure also decreased.  Because storage 
devices are physically small (e.g., can fit on a key fob) but can hold large amounts of 
information, the risk to privacy associated with the loss of such devices increases.  And 
there is anecdotal evidence for this decrease in security.  For example, on PAWS, a 
University of Saskatchewan web portal enabling students to access university services, there 
are often postings from students who have lost (or found) USB storage devices on the 
University campus.     
 
Operating systems (Blue text on Timeline, Figure 3.1) manage the interface between the 
user, the application or program, and the hardware of the computer.  The advantage of the 
single operating systems of the 1990s was that they could be installed on a variety of 
different computers, allowing software to be easily shared between users.  Concomitant 
with these operating system and software developments came changes in the threats to 
privacy.     As software developers rapidly produced new operating systems for market (i.e., 
Microsoft released a new version of its Windows operating system every few years), the 
systems were not fully tested and holes, or errors, in the programming could be exploited, 
thereby putting personal privacy at risk.   For example, Windows 95 was released in 1995; 
                                            
3 A byte is 8 bits (or 8 binary units of the smallest unit of information a computer processes).  Bytes are further 
classified as kilobyte (KB or 1000bytes), Megabyte (MB or 106bytes), Gigabyte (GB or 109bytes) and 
Terabyte (TB or 1012bytes) 
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the first virus (a malicious program that damages computers) that exploited weaknesses in 
Windows 95 appeared a year later (See Timeline, Figure 3.1).    
 
The term end user software refers to complete software packages released to internet users 
(Pink text on Timeline, Figure 3.1).  Java (1995) is a programming language for software 
development that is straightforward and easily transferrable to different platforms.  Early 
viruses designed using such end-user software were developed with the purpose of 
damaging the computer hard-drive; later viruses were designed to covertly copy and 
transmit computer records.  As mentioned earlier, the introduction of end-user software 
gave general users uncontrolled access to tools which once would have required a computer 
programmer’s level of knowledge to execute. 
 
Changes in connectivity and access points to the internet also affect privacy (Diffie & 
Landau, 2008).  The early internet system had few agents and few access points, two 
features which offered structural protection to the data since access was limited.  However, 
as the number and types of connections grew (e.g., dial-up, DSL digital subscriber line, or 
wireless) so did the opportunity for privacy violations.  For example, early wireless signals 
were analogue and were easily captured using basic radio techniques; further, the method of 
capturing the signals was not covered by existing wiretap laws (Diffie & Landau, 2008).  In 
addition, the data transfer speed for different types of connectivity varied (dial-up generally 
transfers data in KB/s while DSL transfers in MB/s), indirectly affecting internet privacy.  
For example, a dial-up connection that cannot easily transfer large files because of the limits 
of the line speed does not present the same privacy risk as a DSL connection where large 
files can be transferred much more quickly. 
  24
Figure 3.1: Timeline 
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The discussion to this point has traced the technical developments of the interpersonal 
computing era and the impact of each of these developments on privacy.  It is clear that 
privacy on the internet is both technical and interactive.  The technical environment shapes 
the structure in which the agents interact, and the interactions of the agent shape the 
technical environment.  It is not possible to consider privacy on the internet independent of 
the technical architecture.      
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CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Overview 
Based on the argument that a) complex adaptive systems theory can guide privacy 
conceptualization in the internet environment, b) interactions between agents on the internet 
influence personal privacy, and c) these interactions are computer-mediated text-based 
interactions, content analysis was determined to be the most efficacious approach for 
examining internet privacy.  Such an analysis “emphasizes the way versions of the world, 
society, [and] events…are produced” (Bryman and Teevan, 2005:344).     
 
For the first research question, How has the popular press educated Canadians about the 
potential changes in personal privacy associated with the advances in technology?, 
Maclean’s magazine was the information source. Mass media, such as Maclean’s, are 
acceptable sources of data for social analysis (Bryman and Teevan, 2005:128).  Maclean’s 
was chosen because it is (a) a general audience publication, and (b) it represents itself as 
“Canada’s only national weekly current affairs magazine” (www.macleans.ca).  It is 
important, however, to acknowledge that the authors and/or publishers of this magazine 
may have presented Canadians with a particular view (i.e., bias) with respect to what 
constitutes newsworthy internet privacy issues.  To identify a possible Maclean’s reporting 
bias, the results of the magazine analysis were compared to the timeline entries, a 
comparison that identified whether the Maclean’s articles reflected actual changes in 
internet privacy concerns or only the newsworthy changes.   
 
For the second research question, What has been the political response from the Canadian 
federal government to the potential changes in personal privacy associated with the 
advances in technology?, the Privacy Commissioner’s Annual Report to Parliament for the 
years 1992 to 2007 served as the data source.  The mandate of the Privacy Commissioner is 
to oversee compliance with the Privacy Act (1983) and Personal Information Protection and 
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Electronic Documents Act or PIPEDA (2001) and to protect the privacy rights of Canadians 
granted by these laws (Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, 2007).  The reports 
were chosen to examine the relationship between the concerns of Canadians and the 
response of the federal government.  Other researchers (e.g., Foley, 2007) have used official 
sources such as government documents when investigating internet privacy issues.      
 
For the third research question, Do the privacy statements on the most popular commercial 
websites accessed by Canadians protect their personal information?, the privacy policies 
posted by business organizations on high traffic websites were the data source.  Privacy 
policies have been used as a data source by other researchers (e.g., Graber et al, 2002).  The 
high traffic sites were identified using Alexa media, which creates a list by counting the 
number of Canadian users on its network who visit a particular site.  However, the internet 
activities of all Canadian internet users are not captured by Alexa.  To compensate for this 
limitation, a large sample size (N=100) was used to obtain a representative cross section of 
privacy policies from a range of websites.  The sample was restricted to English language, 
non-pornographic websites, a requirement which reduced the sample size to 77.  Regarding 
the first restriction, because the researcher is unilingual, only websites with privacy policies 
written in English were analyzed.  Future research could consider websites with policies 
written in other languages.  Pornographic websites were not included because they 
presented unique privacy issues (e.g., with respect to content or age restrictions), which 
were not part of this research.   
 
In order to evaluate the differing privacy statements, a standard was required.  The Personal 
Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA) was chosen because all 
business operating in Canada are required to comply with the provisions of the legislation.   
Schedule 1 of the Act -- Principles Set Out in the National Standard of Canada Entitled 
Model Code for the Protection of Personal Information -- outlines what the obligations of an 
organization are regarding the personal information of Canadians (Knight, Chilcott & 
McNaught, 2006).  Schedule 1 presents the ten essential action elements, the specific 
measures of personal information protection, that must be afforded to Canadians by 
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commercial organizations.  These ten elements are the following: accountability; 
indentifying purposes; consent; limiting collection; limiting use, disclosure, and retention; 
accuracy; safeguards; openness; individual access; and challenging compliance (See Table 
4.1 for the definitions of the ten elements).  To assess the privacy protection of Schedule 1, 
each of the clauses within each of the action elements of the schedule was converted into 
measurable concepts, based on the definition of privacy presented earlier. Appendix 1 lists 
the Schedule 1 clauses and the associated measurement criteria (See Appendix 1). 
Table 4.1: Elements of Schedule 1 and their Definitions (PIPEDA, 2001) 
Element Definition 
Accountability An organization is responsible for personal information under its control and shall designate and individual or individuals who are accountable for the organization’s 
compliance. 
Identifying Purposes The purposes for which personal information is collected shall be identified by the organization at or before the time the information is collected. 
Consent The knowledge and consent of the individual are required for the collection, use, or disclosure of personal information, except where inappropriate. 
Limiting Collection The collection of personal information shall be limited to that which is necessary for the purposes identified by the organization.  Information shall be collected by 
fair and lawful means. 
Limiting Use, Disclosure, and Retention Personal information shall not be used or disclosed for the purposes other than those for which it was collected, except with the consent of the individual or as 
required by law.  Personal information shall be retained only as long as necessary 
for the fulfilment of those purposes. 
Accuracy Personal information shall be as accurate, complete, and up-to-date as is necessary for the purposes for which it is to be used. 
Safeguards Personal information shall be protected by security safeguards appropriate to the sensitivity of the information 
Openness An organization shall make readily available to individuals specific information about its policies and practices relating to the management of personal information. 
Individual Access Upon request, an individual shall be informed of the existence, use, and disclosure of his or her personal information and shall be given access to that information.  An 
individual shall be able to challenge the accuracy and completeness of the 
information and have it amended as appropriate 
Challenging Compliance An individual shall be able to address a challenge concerning compliance with the above principles to the designated individual or individuals accountable for the 
organization’s compliance 
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4.2 Method 
Several methods were used to collect the data from the various data sources, with each data 
source being analyzed for data relevant to the research question.    Content analysis was 
used to extract the data from Maclean’s magazine and the Reports of the Privacy 
Commissioner (questions one and two).  A comparison of the privacy statements to the 
relevant principles in Canadian law was conducted to collect the data for the third research 
question.      
 
In addition to the content analyses, descriptive data were also collected for two of the data 
sources. For the articles from Maclean’s, article location (i.e., page number) and article 
length (i.e., word count) were collected; and for the privacy policies, the number of links 
(i.e., number of “mouse clicks” the user required to locate the privacy policy) to the privacy 
policy from the main page, the number of words in the policy, the reading ease, and the 
analogous grade level of the English were recorded.  Reading ease refers to the Flesch 
reading ease and grade level refers to the Flesch-Kincaid grade level.  These two measures 
determined the comprehension difficulty of a written work and were calculated using 
Microsoft Word.  
 
4.2.1 Maclean’s Magazine  
For the first content analysis, the electronic vender EBSCOhost was used to search issues of 
Maclean’s magazine for relevant articles.  The filters on the vender were set to search for 
issues from January 1, 1992 to December 31, 2007, with different key words being used to 
identify relevant articles.  Relevant was determined by searching for articles that began with 
the definition of internet privacy discussed earlier; for example, articles relating to the loss 
or threat to personal information, the social value of privacy, or secrecy on the internet.  The 
search was further expanded to include related concepts such as databases or Big Brother to 
ensure all relevant articles were captured. A record of the different search terms used (e.g., 
computer privacy, internet privacy, or internet security) was kept.  New search terms were 
input until no new articles were found, a “snowball” analysis technique.  For each relevant 
article, the date, page number, word count, and author were recorded in a spreadsheet, and 
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an electronic copy and paper copy of the article were created.  Each article was read twice: 
first, to determine whether it addressed the research question, and second to determine how 
it addressed the research question.  Notes on the key issues presented in each article were 
collected in a spreadsheet.  From these notes, the articles were grouped according to the 
similarities that were observed.  The categories of similar articles were not determined 
before the analysis, but emerged as the articles were compared to each other. Finally, the 
articles, in chronological order, were compared to the timeline (Figure 3.1) to observe any 
differences between the technical development and the issues of privacy presented by 
Maclean’s magazine. 
 
4.2.2 Privacy Commissioner’s Report to Parliament  
 
A similar approach to that used for the analysis of Maclean’s magazine was followed for the 
content analysis of the Privacy Commissioner's Report to Parliament and for the privacy 
policies.  A copy of each annual Privacy Commissioner’s Report from 1992 to 2007 was 
obtained from the Commissioner’s website.  In 2004, the Report to Parliament was 
separated into two documents, one reporting on the Privacy Act, the other, on PIPEDA.  
Both reports are included in this research.  Each report was read and sections relating to the 
research question reflecting the criteria for internet privacy or the related discussion (e.g., 
databases) were highlighted.  Notes on each section were recorded in a spreadsheet, and 
based on these notes, the discussions were grouped into emerging categories.  Again, the 
discussions, in chronological order, were compared to the timeline (Figure 3.1) to observe 
any differences between the technical development and the issues of privacy presented by 
the Privacy Commissioner. 
 
4.2.3 Privacy Policies  
 
The top 100 most visited websites from the Alexa list of December 17, 2007 were 
identified.  For each website, the web address, existence of a policy, date accessed, date of 
policy, and number of links to the policy from the homepage were recorded.  Each policy 
was saved in HTML form (i.e., HyperText Markup Language or as seen on the actual 
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webpage) and copied into a Microsoft Word document.  The grammar check on the Word 
document was run to determine the word count and comprehension difficulty of the policy.  
Then, each policy was examined using the measurement guide for the clauses of Schedule 1 
in PIPEDA (Principles Set Out in The National Standard of Canada Entitled Model Code 
for The Protection of Personal Information, CAN/CSA-Q-830-96).  Specifically, 
compliance to each sub-clause was recorded as either Yes (in compliance) or No 
(noncompliant).  As well, additional notes regarding aspects of the policies relevant to the 
research questions were recorded on the spreadsheet. 
 
Two content analyses, one of Maclean's magazine and the other of the Privacy 
Commissioner's Report to Parliament, and a compliance audit of popular websites  are the 
source of data for this research.  In the following chapter, the data gathered using these 
methods are reported. 
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CHAPTER 5: RESULTS 
5.1 The Role of the Popular Press in Educating Canadians about Internet Privacy 
One hundred and fourteen articles involving internet privacy were identified in Maclean’s 
magazines.  The analysis of the 114 pieces produced seven themes: (a) anonymity, (b) credit 
card security, (c) databases with personal information, (d) illegal access to computer 
systems, (e) legality, (f) malware or harmful software, and (g) security of computer systems.  
Six of the themes, credit card security, databases, illegal access, legality, malware, and 
security of systems, related directly to issues of deviance (or deviant activities) on the 
internet.  An additional eighth category, other, was added for two articles that did not reflect 
one of the seven themes.  Each article was classified as belonging to one of the six themes; 
that is, the articles were only coded once.  A full description of the categories is found in the 
Table 5.1.  In addition, Table 5.1 reports the number of articles found in each category and 
the year the first article appeared.   
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Table 5.1: Internet Privacy in Maclean’s Magazine 
Category Types of articles  Total Number of 
articles 
Year of first 
articles 
Database electronic files containing 
information about groups 
or individuals 
12 1992 
Malware malicious software (i.e., 
viruses) that poses a 
privacy risk 
14 1992 
Credit Card privacy issues related to 
use of credit cards online 
(i.e., scams) 
6 1994 
Legal legal issues (i.e., cases or 
laws) that relate to internet 
privacy 
15 1994 
Security physical risks (i.e., 
unsecured laptop) that 
threatens privacy 
29 1994 
Hack illegal or unauthorized 
access to electronic files 
containing personal 
information 
22 1995 
Anonymity issues of maintaining 
personal anonymity while 
online 
14 1996 
Other any internet privacy article 
that does not fit into the 
previous seven categories 
2 1999 
 
Table 5.1 indicates that the most prevalent types of internet privacy articles in Maclean’s 
were those concerning security (29 articles, or 25%) and hacking (22 articles, or 19%).  
Security articles were most prevalent in 2006 and 2007 (6 articles, respectively, or 41%).  
The largest number of articles related to hacking appeared in 2000 (7 articles, or 32%).  The 
least prevalent type of article was credit card fraud (6 articles, respectively, or 5%).   
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Of the 114 articles, the largest number for one year appeared in 2000 (17 articles, or 15%); 
the least, in 1992, 1993, and 2002 (2 articles for each of the three years, respectively; see 
Figure 3).  There were 38 articles relating to internet privacy before 2000 (1992-1999) and 
59 after 2000 (2001-2007).   
Figure 5.1: Internet Privacy in Maclean’s Magazine by Year 
 
Figure 5.1 shows four peak years for the internet privacy articles: 1996, 2000, 2004 and 
2006.  The first peak corresponds to the increasing financial success of the internet, the “dot 
com bubble”4 of the mid 1990s; the second, to fears surrounding Y2K5 and the “dot com 
bust” of 2000, specifically, the privacy issues concerning increased business on the internet 
(e.g., collecting and protecting personal information).  The fourth peak corresponds to the 
increasing concerns surrounding the use of social networking sites such as Facebook or 
MySpace, reflecting the increased amount of personal information posted on social 
networking sites.  And the third peak in 2004 does not appear to correlate with any 
particular internet related event. Further, when compared to the Timeline (Figure 3.1), the 
                                            
4 With the increase in technology companies during the late 1990s, the value of Western markets increased.  
The “bubble” burst in 2000, perhaps due to Microsoft losing an American court battle concerning the 
company’s monopoly on operating systems. 
5 Y2K (Year 2000) refers to a concern that computer systems would fail when the date changed from 1999 to 
2000.  Many computer programs only recorded the year with two values (e.g., 96, 97, 98) and some systems 
were not able to start “recounting” (e.g., 00, 01) on January 1, 2000. 
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Maclean’s articles did not reflect the privacy issues associated with the advancing 
technology, indicating a bias in the Maclean’s reports.  That is, trends in the Maclean’s 
articles relating to internet privacy did not reflect the trends in technological development. 
 
For the 114 articles, the mean length was 938 words, with a mode of 1186, a median of 838, 
and a range of 4954 (48 to 5002) words.  Nine Maclean’s articles concerning internet 
privacy were also cover stories: two cover stories in 1995, two in 1996, one in 1998, one in 
1999, two in 2001, and one in 2006.  The cover stories appeared in the magazine 
coincidental with the peaks in Figure 3.1.  The 1996 cover stories addressed the risk to 
business of hackers and the amount of information available on the internet; the 1998 cover 
story addressed data-mining; and, the 1999 cover story, internet pirates.  These four cover 
stories related to issues of business on the internet during the dot com bubble and 
subsequent burst (the first two peaks on Figure 3.1).  The 2001 cover stories addressed 
spying and the general security concerns that emerged in the early 21st century (prior to 
peak 3).  The 2006 cover story addressed increasing discussion of social networking sites 
(peak 4). 
5.2 Political Response to Internet Privacy Concerns 
The results of the discourse analysis on the Privacy Commissioner’s Report to Parliament 
generated five themes concerning internet privacy: (a) the impact of electronic databases on 
internet privacy (b) internet privacy initiatives, (c) legislation relating to internet privacy, 
(d) the impact of new technology and the resulting new terminology on internet privacy 
discussions and (e) privacy warnings.  A full description of the categories appears in Table 
5.2.  The table shows the number of discussions found in each category and the year the first 
discussion appeared.  Figure 5.2 shows the number of discussions per category by year.  
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Table 5.2: Internet Privacy in the Privacy Commissioner’s Reports 
Category Types of discussion included  Total 
number of 
references 
Year first 
appeared 
Law legislation or policies relating to internet privacy 19 1992 
privacy warnings shortcomings of Privacy Act or PIPEDA to protect 
personal information 
24 1992 
new terminology first use of technical terms or jargon 32 1992 
Initiatives surveys, plans, commitments, or calls for legislation 
relating to internet privacy (ties closely with law) 
14 1993 
Database information stored in electronic databases and the use 
of the database 
6 1994 
Figure 5.2: Internet Privacy in the Privacy Commissioner’s Reports by Year 
 
These results indicate that issues concerning personal privacy on the internet were a topic of 
concern for the Privacy Commissioner in 1992, the first year analyzed for this research.  In 
1992, the Commissioner acknowledged that information was routinely exchanged over 
electronic databases, and that the emerging technology would threaten individual control 
over personal information.  In 1993, the limitations of the Privacy Act (1983) with respect 
to technology were discussed, and the Privacy Commissioner called for new privacy 
legislation.  However, the Commissioner did acknowledge that legal interpretations of the 
databases
initiatives
laws
new terminology
privacy warnings
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
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existing Act had been used in cases involving privacy and technology.  An additional 
limitation of the Act noted by the Privacy Commissioner was that the Act did not cover all 
government departments or businesses in Canada.      
 
In 1994, the Privacy Commissioner’s concern shifted to business activities and databases on 
the internet; specifically, the Commissioner was interested in personal information that was 
valuable to businesses and government.  For example, a controversial policy in effect 
between 1994 and 1996 which allowed Customs data to be matched with Employment 
Insurance (EI) data in order to identify EI abuse represented a type of data aggregation the 
Privacy Commissioner thought violated the Privacy Act.   In 1995, the Commissioner 
argued that no computer was safe from hackers.  In 1996, the federal government 
committed to new privacy legislation governing personal information and business, 
legislation that reflected the changing technical landscape.  In 1997, the Commissioner 
warned that Canadians were relying on systems that were not secure.  The Commissioner’s 
concerns were addressed when Bill C-54 (PIPEDA) was tabled in 1998, passed the House 
and Senate in 1999, and became law in two phases, beginning in 2001 and ending in 2002.     
 
In 2001, the Commissioner warned against using the events of September 11, 2001 terrorist 
attacks on the United States6 as a “Trojan horse” to acquire invasive power at the expense of 
the privacy acts.  Later, in 2005, the Commissioner argued that the Privacy Act had been 
weakened by the Anti-Terrorism Act of 20017. 
 
With respect to internet privacy, the results of this analysis of the Privacy Commissioner’s 
Reports indicate the focus of the federal government has been to create legislation to protect 
data concerning Canadians stored within Canada and to regulate the transfer of data.  When 
                                            
6 An Islamic terrorist group hijacked four jetliners on September 11, 2001.  Two were flown into the World 
Trade Centre buildings in New York City, and one into the Pentagon (Headquarters of American 
Department of Defence).  The remaining aircraft crashed into a field in Pennsylvania  before it could reach 
its target 
7 Some of the controversial clauses in the Act were sunset in 2007 and were not renewed by a House vote in 
February of that year 
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the results were compared to the Timeline (Figure 3.1), it appears that the Privacy 
Commissioner was considering the implications of the new technology with respect to the 
privacy of Canadians.  For example, in 1997, the Privacy Commissioner was considering 
the impact of cryptology (encrypting data transferred on the internet).  Similar discussions 
were also being considered in the United States, eventually leading to the relaxation of the 
rules on cryptology “keys” in 2000. 
5.3 Privacy Protection on Commercial Websites 
The final data source examined was the privacy policies of the 100 most visited website 
sites by Canadians.  Of the 77 useable (i.e., English, non-pornographic) websites, eight had 
no privacy policy, or the link to the privacy statement was inoperative.  Of the 69 websites 
with privacy statements, seven could not be used: one claimed not to collect any 
information, two did not collect any information, two did not indicate if personal 
information was collected or not, and the other two had privacy policies that only applied to 
American citizens.  Although only 62 websites were included, in all, 63 privacy polices 
were analyzed because one site had two policies (2 parent companies with different 
policies).  
 
As mentioned earlier, each of the clauses subsumed under the ten principles of Schedule 1 
was operationally defined based on internet privacy, and then the compliance to the clauses 
was assessed for each privacy statement.  In the tables below the measure of each clause is 
described, and the percent compliance (i.e., percentage of the privacy policies which 
complied with the clause) is indicated.  Ten sub-clauses were omitted from the analysis 
because they were not relevant to the internet environment or were undeterminable.   For 
example, clause 4.4.2 “consent with respect to collection [of personal information] is not 
obtained through deception” cannot be determined by reading the privacy policy; that is, if 
the owners of a company operating a website are deceitful, the privacy policy is unlikely to 
indicate the deception.  Table 5.6 (presented later) summarizes the results of sub-clause 
4.3.2., compliance, indicating if companies complied with “reasonable” effort and 
“meaningful” consent the location and reading difficulty of the policies. 
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Table 5.3 shows that the first principle, accountability, had 57% compliance.  (Overall 
compliance was measured as the average compliance for each of the sub-clauses.)  The 
name of the Privacy officer was not usually provided (41%), but the address or email 
address of that individual, or the contact information, was (77%).  However, there was little 
indication the privacy policies of the companies were communicated to the staff.  Most of 
the organizations took responsibility for the security of personal information that they had 
collected, but this responsibility only extended to other businesses hired to fulfil the services 
of the organization.  That is, responsibility did not extend to third parties that also operated 
on the websites, for example, advertisers.  Often, the privacy polices indicated that the third 
parties had their own privacy policies, policies that might not provide the same level of 
protection for personal information.   
Table 5.3: Schedule 1, Principle 1 
Principle Measure 
Percent 
compliance Overall 
Accountability     57% 
4.1.1 name of Privacy Officer (or equivalent) 41%   
4.1.2 
name of person who oversees 
compliance available by request  77%   
4.1.3a 
organization accepts responsibility for 
safe-keeping of personal info;  83%   
4.1.3b 
equivalent protection data transferred to 
3rd parties guaranteed 40%   
4.1.4a procedure to protect personal info. Stated 84%   
4.1.4b1 
mechanism to make a complaint 
(regarding personal info.) included;  73%   
4.1.4b2 guarantee of response 9%   
4.1.4c 
privacy policies are communicated with 
staff 10%   
4.1.4d 
(electronic) privacy policy or privacy 
procedure 93%   
 
The second principle, identifying purposes, examined how the purposes for the personal 
information were communicated to the users.  While the overall compliance rate for this 
category was 61%, two sub-clauses (4.2.3 and 4.2.4) explaining how information is used 
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(e.g., marketing) had 70% and 89% compliance.  Of particular interest was the PIPEDA 
clause (4.2.2) -- that only necessary information was collected.  In many cases, the policy 
stated that the purpose of some of the information was for advertising purposes, meaning 
the information was required specifically for advertising purposes and not necessarily 
required for the service the organization was providing for the user.  
Table 5.4: Schedule 1, Principle 2 
Principle Measure 
Percent 
compliance Overall 
Identifying Purposes   61% 
4.2.1 
organization has a privacy policy beyond 
the electronic public version 3%   
4.2.2 
only necessary info. collected (compare 
to the purpose) 81%   
4.2.3 
purpose for collection of personal info. 
stated before/time of collection 89%   
4.2.4 
states that consent for additional uses of 
personal info. collected before use 70%   
 
The third principle, consent, had 54% compliance.  However, one important sub-clause -- 
that consent be obtained prior to use -- had an 81% compliance rate.  Most of the policies 
indicated how consent would be obtained, but often the consent was negative.  That is, by 
conducting business using the site, users accepted the organization’s privacy policy 
regardless of whether the policy was actually read by the user.  Further, only a little over 
half (56%) of the companies provided a procedure for withdrawing consent.    
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Table 5.5: Schedule 1, Principle 3 
Principle Measure 
Percent 
compliance Overall 
Consent     54% 
4.3.1 
consent obtained for collection and use 
of personal info. 81%   
4.3.2 
"reasonable" effort; "meaningful" 
consent see Table 5.6   
4.3.3 
are there any mandatory fields that 
would prevent obtaining the product 
beyond necessary for stated purpose? 0%   
4.3.4 
is the information collected "sensitive" 
(i.e., reasonable need for privacy?) 77%   
4.3.5 
statement of additional anticipated 
purposes for the personal info. Collected 77%   
4.3.6 
consent for information "like to be 
considered sensitive" obtained? 79%   
4.3.7a online form? 71%   
4.3.7b checkbox? 0%   
4.3.7c telephone? 6%   
4.3.7d at use of product/service? 43%   
4.3.8 
mechanism for withdrawing consent 
stated 56%   
Sub-clause 4.3.2 stipulates that access to details regarding what data will be collected 
should be reasonable to obtain, and the consent to data collection should be meaningful to 
the user.  “Reasonable” was interpreted to mean (a) the ability to find the policy, measured 
by number of links (or “mouse clicks”) to the policy from the homepage; and (b) 
“meaningful” consent, to the length of the privacy statement, reading ease, and grade level, 
based on the Flesch-Kincaid reading ease test. Table 5.6 shows the average policy had a 
word count of 2200 words, or approximately nine pages double spaced, had a reading ease 
of 33, and a grade level of 12.  The longer policies were more specific in their levels of 
protection, but more reading was required from the user to ascertain the protection.  The 
reading ease score was calculated based on the total words, sentences, and syllables in a 
piece of text.  Reading ease is measured on a 100 point scale: 0-30 (very difficult), 31-50 
(difficult), 51-60 (fairly difficult), 61-70 (standard), 71-80 (fairly easy), 81-90 (easy), and 
91-100 (very easy).  For comparison, Reader’s Digest articles usually score 65 (Kerr, 2007).  
As the above point-scale indicates a reading ease of 33 indicates that the privacy policies 
were “difficult” to understand, a comparable reading level to a Harvard Law Review article 
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(Kerr, 2007).  This writing standard was observed for many of the privacy statements, 
which were often written in a legalistic manner.  The grade level,12, indicates the equivalent 
(American) school level. 
Table 5.6: Schedule 1, Principle 3, Sub-Clause 4.3.2 
 Average 
Number of clicks 1.3
Word Count 2192
Reading Ease Score 32.6
Grade 12.13
 
The fourth principle, limiting collection, is related to the third principle in that the request 
for personal information matches the purpose of the service offered by the organization.  
Again, if the purpose was to gain information for advertisers then this purpose was relayed 
to the user.  Advertising in this manner is unique to the internet, for it is impossible to use 
most websites without providing identifying information, whereas in non-internet 
interactions, the customer is not always required to provide identifying information (e.g., 
paying for purchases with cash).   Many of the organizations collected environment data 
(e.g., entry/exit page, IP address, CPU, and browser information), some of it personal in 
nature, from all users who visited the site, regardless of whether the user actually selected 
any of the services available on the site.  Although environmental data may not be 
considered personal information, the IP address, for example, can identify a specific user’s 
computer.   
 
Table 5.7: Schedule 1, Principle 4 
Principle Measure 
Percent 
compliance Overall 
Limiting Collection    83% 
4.4.1 personal info. collected matches purpose  83%   
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The fifth principle concerned the retention time of personal information. None of the 
policies required that personal information be destroyed after a set period of time.  
However, for the policies that did address retention times, the interval was addressed in 
three ways: “indefinitely”, until “no longer required”, or “as required by law”.  Although 
17% addressed retention times, none gave a specific timeframe for destruction of 
information. 
Table 5.8: Schedule 1, Principle 5 
Principle Measure 
Percent 
compliance Overall 
Limiting Use, Disclosure, and Retention     9% 
4.5.2 
states retention 
times for personal 
info. 17%   
4.5.3 
states when 
personal info. is 
destroyed; 
organizational 
policy states when 
personal info. is 
destroyed   0%   
 
The sixth principle, accuracy, addressed whether there was a system to update the 
information.  Sixty-six percent of the organizations had methods for updating users personal 
information, but most were user dependant.  That is, often the personal information was 
updated by the user – the user accessed his/her account on the website and made the 
required changes. 
 
   
Table 5.9: Schedule 1, Principle 6 
Principle Measure 
Percent 
compliance Overall 
Accuracy     23% 
4.6.1 
procedure in place to insure accuracy, 
completeness, and up-to-datedness of 
info. 66%   
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4.6.2 
info. is not routinely updated unless 
required to fulfill original purpose 0%   
4.6.3 info sent to third parties is updated; how? 3%   
 
The seventh principle, safeguards, addressed the protection of personal information stored 
by organizations.  Seventy percent of organizations stated that they protected the 
information, but most did not indicate how this was accomplished.  That is, they did not 
indicate what form of protection was used -- physical, organizational, or electronic. 
Determining if the level of protection matched the sensitivity of the data was, of course, 
subjective, but if the organization mentioned at least one method of protection, then the 
level was assumed to be sufficient.   
Table 5.10: Schedule 1, Principle 7 
Principle Measure 
Percent 
compliance Overall 
Safeguards     28% 
4.7.1 
states that personal information is 
protected by specific safeguards 70%   
4.7.2 
is protection (4.7.1) consistent with 
sensitivity of info (4.3.4)? 40%   
4.7.3a 
statement of physical protection 
measures? 10%   
4.7.3b statement of organizational measures? 27%   
4.7.3c statement of electronic measures? 36%   
4.7.4 
organizational policy is communicated to 
staff  13%   
4.7.5 
statement to the provisions to protect 
personal info. when it is being destroyed 0%   
 
The eighth principle, openness, addressed the types of information that were collected.  
Most of the organizations stated the type of information collected (74%), but not what 
information was passed to third parties (26%). 
Table 5.11: Schedule 1, Principle 8 
Principle Measure 
Percent 
compliance Overall 
Openness     49% 
  45
4.8.1 
policy is available online ("reasonable" 
effort for web based organizations) 94%   
4.8.2c description of personal info. held 74%   
4.8.2e 
description of what personal info. is 
released to related organizations 26%   
4.8.3 
privacy policy available in other (non-
electronic) forms 1%   
 
The ninth principle, individual access, had a compliance of 23%.  Most organizations 
corrected inaccuracies in their data but did not give a timeframe, price, or procedure for 
dealing with unresolved complaints.  Twenty-nine percent of organizations provided a list 
of the third parties that received personal information, but except for one case, the list did 
not include organizational names, just types.  That is, rather than giving specific company 
names (e.g., Oracle or Microsoft), the third parties were only identified by their association 
to the organization (e.g., affiliates, sister organizations, or parent companies).  This 
anonymity makes it difficult or impossible to know the level of privacy protection extended 
by the third parties. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.12: Schedule 1, Principle 9 
Principle Measure 
Percent 
compliance Overall 
Individual Access     23% 
4.9.2 
states information required to access 
personal info. accounts 7%   
4.9.3 
list of possible third parties who 
receive info. 29%   
4.9.4 
time frame for requests stated; cost of 
request stated; form of info. stated  4%   
4.9.5 organization mends inaccuracies  64%   
4.9.6 
procedure for dealing with unresolved 
complaints stated 11%   
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The final principle, challenging compliance, addressed how to make a complaint.  Eighty-
one percent of the organizations had an easily comprehended method for complaining (e.g. 
email address to send enquires), but only one organization guaranteed an investigation. 
Table 5.13: Schedule 1, Principle 10 
Principle Measure 
Percent 
compliance Overall 
Challenging Compliance     55% 
4.10.2 
procedure for complaining is 
"accessible" and "simple" 81%   
4.10.3 
procedure for dealing with 
complaints stated 81%   
4.10.4 
assurances of investigation of 
complaints given; assurance that 
changes made if complaint valid  1%   
With respect to internet privacy, the privacy policies in general do not reflect the clauses of 
Schedule 1.  Certain clauses (e.g., 4.1.4b, mechanism to make a complaint included) had 
fairly high compliance rates; whereas, other clauses within the same principle (e.g., 4.1.4c) 
had very low compliance rates. 
 
In summary, Maclean's magazine had 114 articles over the fifteen year period focusing 
primarily on the lack of security on the internet.  The number of articles was found to track 
current events.  The major achievement of the Privacy Commissioners was the introduction 
of Canada's electronic document act.  The evaluation of the 100 websites revealed 
significant non-compliance with Canada's electronic document act.  In other words, most of 
the clauses in PIPEDA were not supported by the privacy policies posted on the websites. 
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CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION 
6.1 Discussion of the Three Research Questions 
The first research question, How has the popular press educated Canadians about the 
potential changes in personal privacy associated with the advances in technology?, was 
considered from the perspective of Maclean’s magazine.  Often the news media are the 
primary source of information for Canadians regarding issues of public affairs, and media, 
such as Maclean’s, are responsible for “setting the agenda” with respect to news 
(McCombs, 2004).  The results of this research indicate that Maclean’s writers focused on 
the threats to internet privacy.  Their articles examined the sensational aspects of internet 
privacy issues, such as the impact of viruses (e.g., the damage caused to computers by the 
LoveBug virus) and the criminal uses of the internet (e.g., the “Denial of Service” attack by 
the Canadian teen MafiaBoy, who inundated a server with requests, causing the system to 
crash).  By focusing on the deviant uses of the technology, Maclean’s writers left 
unexamined the underlying structure of the internet system, a structure which made the 
deviance possible.   
 
Of particular interest was the uneven coverage of privacy issues: there were four peak years, 
with the number of articles levelling off between the peaks.   The results showed that the 
peaks were roughly linked to specific events of importance in Canadian current affairs, such 
as the commercial dot com boom of the 1990s.  By focusing on specific privacy events, the 
continual changes in the internet that influence privacy were not addressed by Maclean’s 
writers, perhaps leaving the impression with readers that privacy issues are isolated events.      
 
The second research question, What has been the political response from the Canadian 
federal government to the potential changes in personal privacy associated with the 
advances in technology?, addressed the political response to internet privacy concerns.  The 
Privacy Commissioner reported on two aspects of internet privacy: (a) the legislative 
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process to introduce new electronic privacy law, and (b) the privacy issues that would need 
to be considered by Canadians.  The Commissioner continually addressed these two issues 
every year in the context of the current events.  For example, in 2000 and 2004 the 
Commissioner warned about the impact of anti-terrorism legislation, a warning which 
corresponded to the increase in privacy articles in Maclean’s magazine.  Given the 
international nature of the internet, national-level responses (such as PIPEDA) to internet 
privacy issues are not likely to be enough to protect Canadians.  However, from this 
research, it is apparent that the Commissioners’ were raising the flag for Canadians.  That 
is, they were alerting Canadians of the threats to internet privacy.   
 
The third research question, Do the privacy statements on the most popular commercial 
websites accessed by Canadians protect their personal information?, addressed the 
commercial uses for personal information and the threat to internet privacy.  The findings 
suggest that most of the business websites contained privacy policies that were in keeping 
with only some of the provisions of PIPEDA, and the policies were not always that specific 
about the mechanisms for protecting personal information.  It is a concern that many 
policies indicated the collection of personal information for marketing purposes was part of 
the company’s business plan.  Such uses can be interpreted as a violation of PIPEDA as the 
information was being acquired for purposes not related to customers’ purchases.  
Disturbingly, as noted by Hui, Teo, and Lee, users will supply more personal information if 
a business posts a privacy policy, but as this research indicates, the privacy policies are not 
specific enough to suggest adequate coverage (2007).  
 
Commercial businesses obtain personal details during user registration for online services 
(e.g., email from Hotmail) or the purchase of products (e.g., books from Amazon).  The 
results of this research suggest that for the users, once their personal information has been 
obtained, knowing how or where this information is stored, who will be given access to it, 
how the information will be used, and knowing whether it will be combined with other 
personal details for purposes unrelated to the initial transaction is difficult to ascertain.  
From the results, (specifically, Principle 3 and sub-clause 4.3.2) it is clear that the privacy 
statements are not easy to read, a finding which does not reflect the PIPEDA requirement 
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for the policies being accessible and user consent meaningful.  In other words, these policies 
are challenging to read (i.e., a “difficult” reading rating) and comprehend (i.e., a grade “12” 
comprehension level), which makes meaningful consent difficult to assess.  This issue is 
further compounded since the more complex privacy policies were more likely to address 
more of the privacy clauses, but the policies were longer and more challenging to read.  
Further, these results are supported by the research of Graber, D’Alessandro, and Johnson-
West who also found privacy policies to be difficult to read (2002).  It appears then that the 
collection of personal information “results in little or no choice for Internet users and 
relatively few meaningful privacy mechanisms” (Privacy International, 2007).      
6.2 Understanding Internet Privacy using CAS Theory 
A complete understanding of internet privacy cannot be achieved from any one of the 
agent’s perspectives discussed above.  However, Complex Adaptive Systems theory 
provides a more holistic approach to internet privacy by integrating the different 
perspectives.  Specifically, there are four elements of CAS that can guide an explanation of 
internet privacy: co-evolution, fitness landscapes, path dependency, and waves (Walby, 
2005). 
 
Co-evolution is an alternative way of conceptualizing change within complex systems.  That 
is, in systems like the internet that lack a centralized mechanism of control, change, instead 
of being hierarchical and reactionary, is a transforming process, achieved through the 
interaction of different agents and the environment.   The agents’ responses to privacy 
evolve as they adapt to their environment; their responses do not reflect the pressures 
inherent in a hierarchical system.  In other words, changes to internet privacy cannot be 
imposed on the system from any one agent.  When the federal government enacted 
legislation (i.e., PIPEDA) to control internet privacy, it was a response from a traditionally 
hierarchical system and unlikely to be successful on the internet.  For instance, the privacy 
policies of the businesses, which would be expected to reflect current law in a hierarchical 
system, did not on the internet.   
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Each of the agents operating on the internet influences the limits of privacy – when one 
agent changes, the internet environment changes, and therefore, the other agents are 
impacted (Walby, 2005:1).  Accordingly, when government introduces legislation to protect 
privacy, users are educated about the security risks to privacy, and businesses produce 
privacy policies to secure the collection of information; then, the overall environment 
becomes one of system security.  In other words, the internet is autopoiesic, where “each 
component participates in the production or transformation of other components in the 
network” (Walby, 2005:13).  For example, in the beginning of commercial activities on the 
internet, a credit card purchase only required the name, number and expiry date as the actual 
card cannot be offered in the transaction.  This use of card numbers has led to widespread 
internet credit card fraud, and in an environment of system security, a litany of secondary 
passwords are now required from legitimate card-holders. The Bank of Montreal, for 
instance, often requires not only name, credit card number, expiry date, but additional 
passwords or questions, with answers known only to the legitimate card-holder, to allow 
certain internet purchases.  The interaction between agents creates the environment, or the 
structure, of privacy – a structure dominated by security as opposed to protection of privacy.   
 
The internet environment, where the different agents interact causing change, can be 
considered as a fitness landscape (Walby, 2005:2).  That is, as the internet develops through 
interactions, its changing environment is more suited to some types of changes than others.  
The most prevalent changes observed in this research were technical: the changes in 
business and government were transforming as the technology changed.  For example, the 
technology to create and “mine” databases was in place before government, business, or 
users realized its possible applications.  As the interactions between agents changed and the 
applicability of the technology emerged (e.g., enough users on the system to warrant 
commercial databases), the environment changed. 
 
Path dependant change suggest that (a) events impact the system at a later point (i.e., 
history matters), and (b) the order in which such events occur may also impact system 
change.  Paths can cause sudden system changes or gradual changes (Walby 2005:2,15).  
Path dependence does not contradict the earlier discussion of chaotic system (e.g., no 
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repeating patterns of change or states of equilibrium); that is, path dependence does not 
imply linear change, only that historical events may influence current events.  For example, 
data storage devices in the early 1990s were disks with increasingly large memory space, 
but with the introduction of USB storage devices, disks quickly fell out of general use.  An 
interesting example for application of path dependency is seen when social and political 
institutions often “lock in” on particular path developments based on their “power, 
opportunity and knowledge” (Walby, 2005:15).  Such a “lock in” exists for as long as that 
particular path is impacting the system.  This study found that the federal government has 
“locked in” on internet regulation as its approach to protecting privacy.  That is, when the 
Privacy Commissioner called for legislation in 1993, the focus of the federal government 
was and has been on enacting privacy legislation to regulate electronic information. 
 
Earlier in this thesis, privacy was conceptualized using the metaphors (Big Brother and The 
Trial); one final metaphor that CAS theorists use to conceptualize the change in a system is 
the term wave (Walby, 2005).  The wave is a conceptualization of the non-linearity of 
systems like the internet; it is the “simultaneous temporal and spatial dimension of [non-
linear] social change” (Walby,2005:16).  The wave starts in one location, then builds and 
spreads through space and time affecting other agents in other locations, depending on the 
local conditions.  The changes are connected, not linearly, but through the networks linking 
the agents.  The wave is not an institution; rather, it is the energy of transformative change 
that passes through the different agents operating in a system.  Internet privacy can be 
conceptualized as a wave that is affecting all the agents operating on the system through 
their interactions (or networks).  This wave started when the internet opened to general 
users in the early 1990s, and it has affected how businesses operate, how government 
regulates, and how users interact, creating a system where privacy is impossible to maintain.  
6.3 Conclusions 
This research has demonstrated that it could be argued the evolution of the internet has 
created an environment where privacy cannot exist.  Every user, every web page visited, 
and every key stroke is captured electronically, often unbeknownst to the user.  The 
unprecedented amounts of personal information users willing share with web masters has 
  52
led to the development of new goods and services that further reduce their privacy.  For 
example, using its database of purchase histories, Amazon (an internet-based bookstore) 
emails its customers to announce the publication of a new book by their favourite author.  
The internet is not controlled centrally and individual countries can do little to adequately 
protect their citizens.  Certainly, given the low compliance rate with PIPEDA suggested by 
this research, it is clear that Canadian federal laws are not protecting Canadian online users.  
Further, users are not being educated about how their personal information is being 
collected and used for commercial purposes; instead, they are being informed of the 
criminal or deviant aspects of privacy loss.   
 
In summary, users exchange information to complete commercial transactions.  Embedded 
in the transactions are a number of additional personal data elements (e.g., businesses 
collecting additional personal information for advertising which is not required for the 
original transaction) that are not only reusable, but are also a form of currency that can be 
exchanged with others for purposes unrelated to the initial exchange.  Governments have an 
interest in controlling or monitoring these interactions, although the system is beyond 
national level control.  It is clear that the control of internet privacy does not belong to any 
of the agents; that is, users are unaware of the structural limits to privacy, government 
cannot produce effective laws to protect privacy, and business are capitalizing on the 
opportunities that advances in the technology are creating (e.g., data-mining software).  It 
would appear that technology creates the wave that agents respond to, suggesting that 
privacy will continue to erode.  In other words, technology usurps the privacy afforded in 
traditional agent interactions. 
 
This study has shown that the internet is a complex system, with structural barriers 
originating in agent interactions that limit internet privacy.  Further, educational sources 
such as Maclean’s magazine that could raise awareness of these structural limitations, do 
not, but the Privacy Commissioners have made Canadians aware of specific threats to 
personal privacy emerging from internet development and the extent of their legal 
protection.  However, Canadian legislation (PIPEDA) controlling the use of personal 
information in electronic forms is not effective in regulating the websites of Canadian’s 
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most visited sites.  This research has shown the inability of the user or government to 
control the movement of personal information throughout the system.  The system operates 
internationally, making it difficult to know precisely where information is stored.  In 
addition, where the servers (with databases of personal information) are located, and what 
policies and procedures apply to the storage, retrieval, and use of the information (e.g., 
physical or organizational) is difficult to know or change.  Data do not travel in a direct path 
from source to destination; rather, data travel through multiple systems (e.g., routers), 
systems which present numerous structural opportunities for interception.  
 
This research report began with a decade old quote regarding privacy on the internet; 
namely, “[we] have zero privacy anyways”.  The results of this research suggest the 
comment would appear to be accurate: (a) national level governance is not enough to 
protect Canadians, and international governance is not yet in place, (b) business has 
commodified personal information for commercial purposes, and (c) a major Canadian 
magazine does not educate Canadians regarding how structure influences internet privacy.  
The internet is a dynamic system which needs a systematic privacy initiative to ensure that 
privacy, one of Canada’s social values, is not undermined further.  Such an initiative likely 
needs to incorporate an increased user awareness of the limitations of privacy on the 
internet and the consequences to society from the loss.  Further, it is unlikely that a 
traditional hierarchical system of control, such as an international regulatory body, will 
successfully reverse the loss of privacy.  Perhaps, increasing the transparency of the system 
will allow users to influence privacy protection.  
6.4 Research Limitations 
There are two limitations to this research: (a) compliance with the terms in the privacy 
policies, and (b) Maclean’s bias.  First, there is no supporting evidence that any of the 
businesses whose privacy policies were analyzed are actually in compliance with their 
privacy provisions.  That is, the actions of the businesses in relation to privacy were not 
assessed.  Auditing companies operating on the internet may be the most reliable method of 
addressing compliance.  Second, the potential bias in Maclean’s magazine from the 
writers/publishers is reflected in the magazine’s focus on deviance on the internet.  
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Examining other media sources, for example newspaper, radio, and television, would 
address this limitation. 
6.5 Future Research 
Two aspects of internet privacy which could lead to future research are the 
following: (a) the international regulation of the internet, and (b) the increasing interest in 
social networking sites.  First, different nations have different requirements regarding 
privacy, different interpretations of what privacy means, and different motivations for 
creating privacy standards (Wafa, 2008).  These three aspects would all need to be 
considered when attempting to regulate the internet.  Such international cooperation 
regarding the internet is possible; for example, the European Union (EU) has a shared 
standard of privacy protection covering all member countries.  Part of the impetus for 
Canada's new privacy law was the EU requirements that all data transferred out of the EU 
be protected by similar measures followed in the EU (Knight, Chilcott & McNaught, 2006).  
It is, however, difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of the EU guidelines as a form of 
international regulation.  For example, the EU and the United States formed a Safe Harbour 
agreement, which aligned American companies with the EU guidelines.  But in the nine 
years Safe Harbours has operated, none of the 1300 American participants has ever had its 
certification suspended or revoked (Wafa, 2008).  Second, one of the latest trends on the 
internet is the proliferation of social networking sites such as Facebook or MySpace.  These 
sites raise a number of privacy issues: for example, (a) the type of information users post, 
(b) the personal risks associated with posting (e.g., bullying comments), (c) the controls on 
the users who visit the postings, (d) the security of the system, and (e) the advertising 
potential.  These sites are considered a “goldmine” to advertisers because of the user 
behavioural information that is available for commercial analysis (Wafa, 2008:12).  
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6.6 Final Word 
This study has shown that Canadians should consider their privacy in this amazing time of 
technological development on the internet.  The following quote, in tribute to George 
Orwell and Franz Kafka, serves as a warning: “Privacy is like health, when you have it, you 
don’t notice it. Only when it’s gone do you wish you’d done more to protect it.”8 (Wafa, 
2008:15) 
                                            
8 Original quote is from Bob Sullivan, MSNBC, “Privacy Lost: EU, U.S. Laws differ Greatly” (Oct. 19, 2006) 
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APPENDIX 1: PIPEDA 
This appendix documents how the provisions of the privacy legislation (PIPEDA) were 
transformed so that they could be used to evaluate the privacy policies.  Each of the 
following tables represents one of the ten clauses of Schedule 1 of PIPEDA.  The first 
column gives the rational for the clause; the second describes the sub-clauses; the third 
provides a quantitative measure for each sub-clause; and the fourth gives the value for the 
measure (i.e., yes/no or open). 
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Principle 1 — Accountability Sub-clause Measure Response 
An organization is responsible for 
personal information under its 
control and shall designate an 
individual or individuals who are 
accountable for the 
 
 
 
 
 
  
organization’s compliance with the 
following principles. 
4.1.1 Accountability for the organization’s 
compliance with the principles rests 
with the designated individual(s), 
even though other individuals within 
the organization may be responsible 
for the day-to-day collection and 
processing of personal information. 
In addition, other individuals within 
the organization may be delegated to 
act on behalf of the designated 
individual(s). 
name of Privacy Officer 
(or equivalent) 
yes (name) / no 
4.1.2 The identity of the individual(s) 
designated by the organization to 
oversee the organization’s 
compliance with the principles shall 
be made known upon request. 
name of person who 
oversees compliance 
available by request 
(beyond scope of 
analysis) 
 
4.1.3a An organization is responsible for 
personal information in its 
possession or custody, including 
information that has been transferred 
to a third party for processing.  
organization accepts 
responsibility for safe-
keeping of personal info  
yes / no 
4.1.3b The organization shall use 
contractual or other means to 
provide a comparable level of 
protection while the information is 
being processed by a third party. 
equivalent protection 
data transferred to 3rd 
parties guaranteed 
yes / no 
4.1.4 Organizations shall implement 
policies and practices to give effect 
to the principles, including: 
  
4.1.4a (a) implementing procedures to 
protect personal information; 
procedure to protect 
personal info. stated 
yes / no 
4.1.4b1 (b) establishing procedures to 
receive and respond to complaints 
and inquiries; 
mechanism to make a 
complaint (regarding 
personal info.) included;  
yes (address, 
telephone, ect.) 
/ no 
4.1.4b2  guarantee of response yes / no 
4.1.4c (c) training staff and communicating 
to staff information about the 
organization’s policies and 
practices; and 
privacy policies are 
communicated with 
staff 
yes / no 
4.1.4d (d) developing information to 
explain the organization’s policies 
and procedures. 
(electronic) privacy 
policy or privacy 
procedure 
yes / no 
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Principle 2 — 
Identifying Purposes 
Sub-clause Measure Response 
The purposes for which 
personal information is 
collected shall be 
identified by the 
organization at or before 
the time the information 
is collected.    
4.2.1 The organization shall document the purposes 
for which personal information is collected in 
order to comply with the Openness principle 
(Clause 4.8) and the Individual Access principle 
(Clause 4.9). 
organization has a privacy 
policy beyond the 
electronic public version 
yes / no 
4.2.2 Identifying the purposes for which personal 
information is collected at or before the time of 
collection allows organizations to determine the 
information they need to collect to fulfill these 
purposes. The Limiting Collection principle 
(Clause 4.4) requires an organization to collect 
only that information necessary for the 
purposes that have been identified. 
only necessary info. 
collected (compare to the 
purpose) 
yes / no 
4.2.3 The identified purposes should be specified at 
or before the time of collection to the individual 
from whom the personal information is 
collected. Depending upon the way in which 
the information is collected, this can be done 
orally or in writing. An application form, for 
example, may give notice of the purposes. 
purpose for collection of 
personal info. stated 
before/time of collection 
yes 
(negative, 
check-box) / 
no 
4.2.4 When personal information that has been 
collected is to be used for a purpose not 
previously identified, the new purpose shall be 
identified prior to use. Unless the new purpose 
is required by law, the consent of the individual 
is required before information can be used for 
that purpose. For an elaboration on consent, 
please refer to the Consent principle (Clause 
4.3). 
states that consent for 
additional uses of personal 
info. collected before use 
yes / no 
4.2.5 Persons collecting personal information should 
be able to explain to individuals the purposes 
for which the information is being collected. 
if emailed/called, 
representative would be 
able to explain purpose 
(beyond scope of analysis) 
 
4.2.6 This principle is linked closely to the Limiting 
Collection principle (Clause 4.4) and the 
Limiting Use, Disclosure, and Retention 
principle (Clause 4.5). 
n/a 
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Principle 3 — Consent Sub-clause Measure Response 
The knowledge and consent 
of the individual are required 
for the collection, use, or 
disclosure of personal 
information, except where 
inappropriate. 
   
4.3.1 Consent is required for the collection of personal 
information and the subsequent use or disclosure of 
this information. Typically, an organization will 
seek consent for the use or disclosure of the 
information at the time of collection. In certain 
circumstances, consent with respect to use or 
disclosure may be sought after the information has 
been collected but before use (for example, when an 
organization wants to use information for a purpose 
not previously identified). 
consent obtained for 
collection and use of 
personal info. 
yes / no 
4.3.2 The principle requires “knowledge and consent”. 
Organizations shall make a reasonable effort to 
ensure that the individual is advised of the purposes 
for which the information will be used. To make the 
consent meaningful, the purposes must be stated in 
such a manner that the individual can reasonably 
understand how the information will be used or 
disclosed. 
"reasonable" effort; 
"meaningful" consent 
"reasonable" = 
number of 
clicks, size of 
font. 
"meaningful" 
= reading 
score 
4.3.3 An organization shall not, as a condition of the 
supply of a product or service, require an individual 
to consent to the collection, use, or disclosure of 
information beyond that required to fulfill the 
explicitly specified, and legitimate purposes. 
consent is given for the 
specified and legitimate 
purpose 
are there any 
mandatory 
fields that 
would prevent 
you getting 
the product 
4.3.4 The form of the consent sought by the organization 
may vary, depending upon the circumstances and 
the type of information. In determining the form of 
consent to use, organizations shall take into account 
the sensitivity of the information. Although some 
information (for example, medical records and 
income records) is almost always considered to be 
sensitive, any information can be sensitive, 
depending on the context. For example, the names 
and addresses of subscribers to a newsmagazine 
would generally not be considered sensitive 
information. However, the names and addresses of 
subscribers to some special-interest magazines 
might be considered sensitive. 
is the information collected 
"sensitive" (i.e., reasonable 
need for privacy?) 
yes (what 
info.?) / no 
4.3.5 In obtaining consent, the reasonable expectations of 
the individual are also relevant. For example, an 
individual buying a subscription to a magazine 
should reasonably expect that the organization, in 
addition to using the individual’s name and address 
for mailing and billing purposes, would also contact 
the person to solicit the renewal of the subscription. 
In this case, the organization can assume that the 
individual’s request constitutes consent for specific 
purposes. On the other hand, an individual would 
not reasonably expect that personal information 
given to a health-care professional would be given 
to a company selling health-care products, unless 
consent were obtained. Consent shall not be 
obtained through deception. 
statement of additional 
purposes for the personal 
info. collected 
yes / no 
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4.3.6 The way in which an organization seeks consent 
may vary, depending on the circumstances and the 
type of information collected. An organization 
should generally seek express consent when the 
information is likely to be considered sensitive. 
Implied consent would generally be appropriate 
when the information is less sensitive. Consent can 
also be given by an authorized representative (such 
as a legal guardian or a person having power of 
attorney). 
consent for information 
"like to be considered 
sensitive" obtained? 
yes/no 
4.3.7 Individuals can give consent in many ways. For 
example: 
  
4.3.7a (a) an application form may be used to seek consent, 
collect information, and inform the individual of the 
use that will be made of the information. By 
completing and signing the form, the individual is 
giving consent to the collection and the specified 
uses; 
online form? yes / no 
4.3.7b (b) a checkoff box may be used to allow individuals 
to request that their names and addresses not be 
given to other organizations. Individuals who do not 
check the box are assumed to consent to the transfer 
of this information to third parties; 
checkbox? yes / no 
4.3.7c (c) consent may be given orally when information is 
collected over the telephone; or 
telephone? yes / no 
4.3.7d (d) consent may be given at the time that individuals 
use a product or service. 
at use of product/service? yes / no 
4.3.8 An individual may withdraw consent at any time, 
subject to legal or contractual restrictions and 
reasonable notice. The organization shall inform the 
individual of the implications of such withdrawal. 
mechanism for withdrawing 
consent stated 
yes / no 
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Principle 4 — 
Limiting Collection 
Sub-clause Measure Response 
The collection of 
personal information 
shall be limited to that 
which is necessary for 
the purposes identified 
by the organization. 
Information shall be 
collected by fair and 
lawful means. 
   
4.4.1 Organizations shall not collect personal 
information indiscriminately. Both the 
amount and the type of information 
collected shall be limited to that which is 
necessary to fulfill the purposes 
identified. Organizations shall specify the 
type of information collected as part of 
their information-handling policies and 
practices, in accordance with the 
Openness principle (Clause 4.8). 
personal info. 
collected 
matches 
purpose 
yes / no 
4.4.2 The requirement that personal 
information be collected by fair and 
lawful means is intended to prevent 
organizations from collecting information 
by misleading or deceiving individuals 
about the purpose for which information 
is being collected. This requirement 
implies that consent with respect to 
collection must not be obtained through 
deception. 
stated purpose 
for collection is 
not "misleading 
or deceiving" 
(beyond scope 
of analysis) 
n/a 
4.4.3 This principle is linked closely to the 
Identifying Purposes principle (Clause 
4.2) and the Consent principle (Clause 
4.3). 
n/a 
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Principle 5 — Limiting Use, 
Disclosure, and Retention 
Sub-clause Measure Response 
Personal information shall not be 
used or disclosed for purposes 
other than those for which it was 
collected, except with the consent 
of the individual 
or as required by law. Personal 
information shall be retained only 
as long as necessary for the 
fulfillment of those purposes. 
   
4.5.1 Organizations using personal 
information for a new purpose shall 
document this purpose (see Clause 
4.2.1). 
repeats 4.2.4 
 
4.5.2 Organizations should develop 
guidelines and implement 
procedures with respect to the 
retention of personal information. 
These guidelines should include 
minimum and maximum retention 
periods. Personal information that 
has been used to make a decision 
about an individual shall be retained 
long enough to allow the individual 
access to the information after the 
decision has been made. An 
organization may be subject to 
legislative requirements with 
respect to retention periods. 
states retention 
times for 
personal info. 
yes (time 
frame) / no 
4.5.3 Personal information that is no 
longer required to fulfill the 
identified purposes should be 
destroyed, erased, or made 
anonymous. Organizations shall 
develop guidelines and implement 
procedures to govern the destruction 
of personal information. 
states when 
personal info. is 
destroyed; 
organizational 
policy states 
when personal 
info. is 
destroyed   
yes / no 
4.5.4 This principle is closely linked to 
the Consent principle (Clause 4.3), 
the Identifying Purposes principle 
(Clause 4.2), and the Individual 
Access principle (Clause 4.9). 
n/a  
 
 
 
 
  66
Principle 6 — Accuracy Sub-clause Measure Response 
Personal information shall 
be as accurate, complete, 
and up-to-date as is 
necessary for the purposes 
for which it is to be used. 
   
4.6.1 The extent to which personal 
information shall be accurate, 
complete, and up-to-date will 
depend upon the use of the 
information, taking into account 
the interests of the individual. 
Information shall be sufficiently 
accurate, complete, and up-to-
date to minimize the possibility 
that inappropriate information 
may be used to make a decision 
about the individual. 
procedure in place to 
insure accuracy, 
completeness, and up-to-
datedness of info. 
yes / no 
4.6.2 An organization shall not 
routinely update personal 
information, unless such a 
process is necessary to fulfill the 
purposes for which the 
information was collected. 
info. is not routinely 
updated unless required 
to fulfill original purpose 
yes / no 
4.6.3 Personal information that is used 
on an ongoing basis, including 
information that is disclosed to 
third parties, should generally be 
accurate and up-to-date, unless 
limits to the requirement for 
accuracy are clearly set out. 
info sent to third parties 
is updated 
yes (open) / 
no 
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Principle 7 — Safeguards Sub-clause Measure Response 
Personal information shall 
be protected by security 
safeguards appropriate to the 
sensitivity of the 
information. 
   
4.7.1 The security safeguards shall protect 
personal information against loss or 
theft, as well as unauthorized access, 
disclosure, copying, use, or 
modification. Organizations shall protect 
personal information regardless of the 
format in which it is held. 
states that 
personal 
information is 
protected by 
specific 
safeguards 
yes 
(passwords, 
encryption) / 
no 
4.7.2 The nature of the safeguards will vary 
depending on the sensitivity of the 
information that has been collected, the 
amount, distribution, and format of the 
information, and the method of storage. 
More sensitive information should be 
safeguarded by a higher level of 
protection. The concept of sensitivity is 
discussed in Clause 4.3.4. 
is protection 
(4.7.1) consistent 
with sensitivity of 
info. (4.3.4)? 
yes / no 
4.7.3 The methods of protection should 
include:   
4.7.3a (a) physical measures, for example, 
locked filing cabinets and restricted 
access to offices; 
statement of 
physical 
protection 
measures? 
yes / no 
4.7.3b (b) organizational measures, for 
example, security clearances and 
limiting access on a “need-to-know” 
basis; and 
statement of 
organizational 
measures? 
yes / no 
4.7.3c (c) technological measures, for example, 
the use of passwords and encryption. 
statement of 
electronic 
measures? 
yes / no 
4.7.4 Organizations shall make their 
employees aware of the importance of 
maintaining the confidentiality of 
personal information. 
organizational 
policy is 
communicated to 
staff 
yes / no 
4.7.5 
 
 
 
Care shall be used in the disposal or 
destruction of personal information, to 
prevent unauthorized parties from 
gaining access to the information (see 
Clause 4.5.3). 
statement to the 
provisions to 
protect personal 
info. when it is 
being destroyed 
yes / no 
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Principle 8 — Openness Sub-clause Measure Response 
An organization shall make 
readily available to 
individuals specific 
information about its policies 
and practices relating to the 
management of personal 
information. 
   
4.8.1 Organizations shall be open about 
their policies and practices with 
respect to the management of personal 
information. Individuals shall be able 
to acquire information about an 
organization’s policies and practices 
without unreasonable effort. This 
information shall be made available in 
a form that is generally 
understandable. 
policy is available 
online 
("reasonable" 
effort for web 
based 
organizations) 
yes / no 
4.8.2 The information made available shall 
include: 
  
4.8.2a (a) the name or title, and the address, 
of the person who is accountable for 
the organization’s policies and 
practices and to whom complaints or 
inquiries can be forwarded; 
repeats 4.1.2 
 
4.8.2b (b) the means of gaining access to 
personal information held by the 
organization; 
repeats 4.1.4 
 
4.8.2c (c) a description of the type of 
personal information held by the 
organization, including a general 
account of its use; 
description of 
personal info. 
held 
yes 
(description) 
/ no 
4.8.2d (d) a copy of any brochures or other 
information that explain the 
organization’s policies, standards, or 
codes; and 
repeats 4.1.4 
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4.8.2e (e) what personal information is made 
available to related organizations (e.g., 
subsidiaries). 
description of 
what personal 
info. is released to 
related 
organizations 
yes 
(description) 
/ no 
4.8.3 An organization may make 
information on its policies and 
practices available in a variety of 
ways. The method chosen depends on 
the nature of its business and other 
considerations. For example, an 
organization may choose to make 
brochures available in its place of 
business, mail information to its 
customers, provide online access, or 
establish a toll-free telephone number. 
privacy policy 
available in other 
(non-electronic) 
forms 
yes 
(method) / 
no 
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Principle 9 — Individual 
Access 
Sub-clause Measure Response 
Upon request, an individual 
shall be informed of the 
existence, use, and 
disclosure of his or her 
personal information and 
shall be given access to that 
information. 
   
4.9.1 Upon request, an organization shall inform an individual 
whether or not the organization holds personal information 
about the individual. Organizations are encouraged to 
indicate the source of this information. The organization 
shall allow the individual access to this information. 
However, the organization may choose to make sensitive 
medical information available through a medical 
practitioner. In addition, the organization shall provide an 
account of the use that has been made or is being made of 
this information and an account of the third parties to 
which it has been disclosed. 
repeats 4.1.4  
4.9.2 An individual may be required to provide sufficient 
information to permit an organization to provide an account 
of the existence, use, and disclosure of personal 
information. The information provided shall only be used 
for this purpose. 
states information 
required to access 
personal info. 
accounts 
yes (type of 
info.) / no 
4.9.3 In providing an account of third parties to which it has 
disclosed personal information about an individual, an 
organization should attempt to be as specific as possible. 
When it is not possible to provide a list of the organizations 
to which it has actually disclosed information about an 
individual, the organization shall provide a list of 
organizations to which it may have disclosed information 
about the individual. 
list of third parties 
who receive info. 
yes / no 
4.9.4 An organization shall respond to an individual’s request 
within a reasonable time and at minimal or no cost to the 
individual. The requested information shall be provided or 
made available in a form that is generally understandable. 
For example, if the organization uses abbreviations or 
codes to record information, an explanation shall be 
provided. 
time frame for 
requests stated; cost 
of request stated; 
form of info. stated 
yes (days, 
hours, ect., 
open) / no 
4.9.5 When an individual successfully demonstrates the 
inaccuracy or incompleteness of personal information, the 
organization shall amend the information as required. 
Depending upon the nature of the information challenged, 
amendment involves the correction, deletion, or addition of 
information. Where appropriate, the amended information 
shall be transmitted to third parties having access to the 
information in question. 
organization mends 
inaccuracies 
yes / no 
4.9.6 When a challenge is not resolved to the satisfaction of the 
individual, the substance of the unresolved challenge shall 
be recorded by the organization. When appropriate, the 
existence of the unresolved challenge shall be transmitted 
to third parties having access to the information in 
question. 
procedure for 
dealing with 
unresolved 
complaints stated 
yes / no 
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Principle 10 — 
Challenging Compliance 
Sub-clause Measure Response 
An individual shall be able 
to address a challenge 
concerning compliance 
with the above principles to 
the designated individual 
   
or individuals accountable 
for the organization’s 
compliance. 
   
4.10.1 
The individual accountable for an 
organization’s compliance is 
discussed in Clause 4.1.1. 
repeats 4.1.1  
4.10.2 
Organizations shall put procedures 
in place to receive and respond to 
complaints or inquiries about their 
policies and practices relating to 
the handling of personal 
information. The complaint 
procedures should be easily 
accessible and simple to use. 
repeats 4.1.4; procedure 
for complaining is 
"accessible" and 
"simple" "accessible" = 
stated in privacy policy 
yes / no 
4.10.3 
Organizations shall inform 
individuals who make inquiries or 
lodge complaints of the existence 
of relevant complaint procedures. 
A range of these procedures may 
exist. For example, some 
regulatory bodies accept 
complaints about the personal-
information handling practices of 
the companies they regulate. 
procedure for dealing 
with complaints stated yes / no 
4.10.4 
An organization shall investigate 
all complaints. If a complaint is 
found to be justified, the 
organization shall take appropriate 
measures, including, if necessary, 
amending its policies and 
practices. 
assurances of 
investigation of 
complaints given; 
assurance that changes 
made if complaint valid 
(beyond scope of 
analysis) 
yes / no; n/a 
 
 
